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Abstract

Both the classical and behavioral models of decision-making
fall short of sufficiently explaining irrational individual decisions and
paradoxical social phenomena. The theory of non-choice offers a more
satisfying account of individual decision-making. A review of the
deficiencies in the classical and behavioral models demonstrates the
need for a new conception of choice. Drawing upon the philosophies of
Hannah Arendt and Immanuel Kant, among others, choice is defined as
the alignment of thought, will, and action. Stemming from this new model
of choice is the theory of non-choice, defined as either the misalignment
of the tri-partite decision process or a decision made without thought.
The new conceptions of choice and non-choice salvage human
rationality and freedom in individuals’ decisions, even when the decision
outcomes are against individuals’ self-interest. Redefining social norms
as the collection of individual non-choices more thoroughly explains
widespread, illogical social behavior. Cases of behavioral phenomena
with negative externalities, including practices of female genital
mutilation/cutting and foot-binding, are examined alongside those with
positive externalities, including the voting paradox and organ donation.
The concept of non-choice included in these case studies signals that
individuals’ counter-preferential behavior is not necessarily caused by
irrational decisions, nor motivated by evil or altruistic preferences; rather,
it is banal behavior. The banality of evil and the banality of goodness on
a large-scale have implications for assigning responsibility to individual
action and for motivating pro-social decisions. Most significantly, the
concept of non-choice offers normative guidance for the individual
decision maker to salvage her rationality and freedom of choice amid the
presence of coercive social norms.

Introduction
A non-choice led Judge Guido Calabresi’s father to became an active
anti-Fascist revolutionary. His behavior was not a deliberate, conscious,
and active choice, but an unintentional, unconscious, and passive nonchoice. While attending a “perfectly horrible speech” by the Fascist Minister
of Education in 1924 Italy, Calabresi’s father failed to applaud during an
interruption of the speech. He didn’t hiss or boo. He didn’t refrain from
applauding because he was particularly political. Rather, he didn’t applaud
because “there was nothing to applaud.” It was simply a bad speech. From
this simple abstention from action, the crowd marked his father as an antiVolume 8 | Spring 2013
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Fascist (Calabresi, “Graduation Remarks”). Was his father conscious that his
action appeared to be a staunch political statement? Was his father simply
irrational in his decision not to applaud? Or was he simply not thinking
about his actions’ consequences?
Calabresi’s remarks touch upon an often over-looked subject: the
concept of non-choice. Standard theories for understanding individual
decision-making and large-scale social behavior, including classical
economics and behavioral economics, attribute motives or preferences to
individual decisions. The decision theories assume that individual actions
are prompted by an active, conscious preference. When individuals act
against their narrow self-interest, classical economists explain it as a
“mistake” that will be corrected by the invisible hand of the market, while
behavioral economists explain it as either “irrational” behavior or motivated
by a social preference. Neither explanation satisfactorily explains largescale phenomena that are caused by intentional decisions, but nonetheless
act against an individual’s self-interest or preference, such as the prevalence
of female genital mutilation/cutting or voting. Non-choice provides a more
satisfactory answer.
Non-choice is characterized not by acting according to self-defined
preferences or motivations, as in the classical and behavioral models, but by
actions taken without preparatory thought or taken counter-preferentially.
Calabresi asked his dad why he chose to become an active anti-Fascist, seeking
to understand his motivation behind his politics. His father replied that he
did not choose to be an active anti-Fascist, as his behavior was not motivated
by political sentiments. His inaction snowballed into a political career,
something that was unpredictable to his father even in retrospect. Hannah
Arendt was one of the first to note that evil consequences can stem from a
lack of thought in a decision—a non-choice (Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem).
Less attention has been spent on the possible positive consequences from
non-choices. Calabresi’s father says, “Everybody talks about the banality of
evil; nobody talks about the banality of good” (“Graduation Remarks”). He
was not motivated by altruism, but nonetheless behaved in a good manner.
Non-choices are prevalent, everyday occurrences, but seldom
do they produce the dramatic consequences of Calabresi’s father’s nonchoice. In fact, non-choices are often mundane: they occur when I set out
luminarias in front of my home on Christmas Eve in New Mexico; they
occur when I automatically include a 20% tip on a restaurant bill; and they
even occur when I choose not to give a panhandler a dollar on the streets of
Philadelphia. These mundane decisions are not necessarily unpredictable in
their consequences: my non-choice of setting out luminarias perpetuates the
tradition each holiday season; my non-choice to tip 20% compensates for the
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below-minimum-wage income of the server; and my non-choice to ignore
the panhandler can leave him destitute, or can inspire another to give him
even more money, transforming his life.
Paradoxical, large-scale social phenomena with both positive and
negative externalities may be explained by amassing individual non-choices.
While singular non-choices may have tremendous consequences for the
individual and society at large, aggregating many parallel non-choices may
have even more significant effects. When presented with unpredictable and
unexplainable social phenomena, the classical and behavioral economists’
traditional tools of individual motives and preferences fall short. Social
norms, reconceived as the aggregation of individual non-choices across a
population, may provide a more adequate method to explain paradoxical
social phenomena than classical or behavioral economists. Social norms with
negative externalities, such as female genital mutilation and foot-binding, or
those with positive externalities, such as voting and default organ donation
registries, are not necessarily caused by evil or altruistic motivations.
Nor are those decisions necessarily in accordance with an individual’s
preferences. Rather, those phenomena are perpetuated through a simple
lack of thought or a counter-preferential action. Conforming to the norm is
not a genuine free choice, but conditional upon the expectations of others’
behavior. Individuals acting according to conditional preferences are no
longer autonomous, active choosers, but conditioned, banal non-choosers.
Non-choosers do not act. They behave.
With these wide-ranging implications for both the individual and
for society, it is a wonder that non-choice hasn’t been given more critical
attention. The lack of focus on non-choice may be caused by the general
wonder and infatuation with choice. At the center of democratic functioning,
and arguably at the core of humanity, is the concept of choice. Indeed,
members of democracy live in the “land of the free,” where each is free to
pursue his or her dreams. Choice is revered in art—Hamlet must choose
“to be or not to be,” upheld in the founding documents of democracies—
the inalienable right to liberty is inscribed in the U.S. Declaration of
Independence, and pondered upon in philosophy—Kant’s conception of
freedom and Aristotle’s notion of reason are essential to humanity. Isaiah
Berlin says in the Essays on Liberty, “Those who have ever valued liberty for
its own sake believed that to be free to choose, and not to be chosen for, is
an inalienable ingredient in what makes human beings human” (Ben-Porath
15). Choice continues to be metaphysically deconstructed by philosophers,
leveraged by policymakers, and manipulated by business marketers. At
the core of these discussions is the fear of limitations on choice—the state’s
limitation on citizens’ freedom, the society’s limitation on citizens’ choice
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options, and the individual’s own limitations on his/her rationality. The
discussions focus on an active decision model, in which individuals may be
constrained, but nonetheless actively choose their own life trajectory.
The purpose of this project is to expand upon the behavioral model
of decision-making by offering another explanatory variable to paradoxical
social phenomena: non-choice. Non-choice not only presents a better
descriptive account of unexplainable social phenomena, but also a normative
view of choice, offering philosophers and policymakers an opportunity
to salvage individual freedom and rationality in the new choice model.
Ultimately, just as classical economists are mistaken to assume perfect
rationality of individual decision-makers, behavioral economists are equally
mistaken to label individuals as “irrational” in their decisions. Humans are
not irrational if their freedom resides in their abilities to think. Individuals
acting in society are no longer fools for making counter-preferential decisions,
but are simply engaging in non-choices.
Conceptions of Individual Choice
Individual decision theories and economic theories rest their
findings on the assumption of choice—equating decisions in the marketplace
to choices. Reviewing the classical and behavioral accounts of individual
choice offers the platform to critique this assumption, and supports the claim
that decisions are not synonymous with choices. Both theories conceive of
choice as comprised of freedom and rationality, while each focuses on the
constitutive elements in differing degrees. As Sigal Ben-Porath says in Tough
Choices, “The mainstream scholarly and political view on choice sees [choice]
as a derivative of conditions of freedom and as based on the capabilities of
individuals to autonomously express and execute their preferences” (6). In
short, when afforded both the liberty and rationality to act, individuals can
autonomously choose.
While founded upon the same constitutive elements, the classical
and behavioral economic models place differing emphasis on the limits
to choice: the classical model focuses on lifting the state restrictions to act
in the marketplace, while the behavioral model focuses on creating more
opportunities for free choice in the marketplace. The models may differ
in their focus on limits to free choice, but both rest on the assumption that
every decision is, in fact, a choice. The models attempt to derive theories,
based on either normative principles or empirical evidence, to explain and
predict individual decision-making. While their approaches differ, their aim
is the same: to accurately explain behavioral phenomena. Outlining their
different approaches opens the floodgates for critiquing the adequacy of the
explanatory power of each model and reveals the opportunity for the theory
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of non-choice to explain paradoxical choices, at both the micro and macro
levels.
The Classical Model
At the center of the classical model of economics is the theory of
rational choice. This emphasis arises from a long philosophical tradition
that sees rationality as the necessary pre-requisite to autonomous choice.
Hamlet, both the most and least rational Shakespearean character, remarks
on the utter magnificence of human reason. He extols to Rosencrantz:
What a piece of work is a man, how noble in reason, how infinite in faculties,
in form and moving how express and admirable, in action how like an angel,
in apprehension how like a god! the beauty of the world, the paragon of
animals—and yet, to me, what is this quintessence of dust? Man delights not
me—nor woman neither, though by your smiling you seem to say so. (The
Tragedy of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, Act II, Scene 2, 303-312)

Dan Ariely notes that this quotation reflects the predominant view of human
nature, shared by economists, policymakers, and “everyday Joes,” that
humans are inherently rational creatures (xviii). Hamlet’s praise of human
reason is echoed throughout time. Plato’s Socrates proclaims, “Reason is
the only thing which once it is born in man, remains with him throughout
his life as the protector of virtue” (The Republic, Book 8, 549b). Aristotle
characterizes human nature as based in the capacity to reason: “For man,
therefore, the life according to reason is best and pleasantest, since reason
more than anything else is man” (Vol. 19). For Immanuel Kant, reason was
the decisive cognitive process for self-legislation, or humans acting according
to their own self-governed goals. His notion of the categorical imperative,
in fact, is based upon the notion that actions are only justified by principles
determined by reason: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can,
at the same time, will that it should become a universal law” (Kant 30). The
state also emphasizes rationality in choice, and uses diminished rationality
to limit a citizen’s action. For instance, if a citizen is deemed limited in
her rational capacity, it is justified to prevent her from acting or to have a
surrogate decision-maker choose on her behalf. Such is the case when the
democratic state precludes citizens under a certain age—typically 18—
from voting, justified by their insufficiently developed intellect to make an
informed political decision.
Rational choice theory stems from this philosophical tradition of
rationality as the central facet of individual decision-making. Jon Elster
describes rational choice theory as both normative—telling people how to
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choose, and prescriptive—telling them how to act in order to best achieve
their aims. Its explanatory account of human behavior is of secondary
importance (Elster 21). The following model is the basic structure of the
rational choice theory (Elster 22):

A Rational Choice
Action

Desires

Beliefs

Figure 1

Information

For an action to be a rational choice, it must satisfy three conditions. First, it
must be the best means of satisfying the desires of the individual, given his
beliefs. Importantly, those beliefs must also be rational (Elster 22). If I desire
to satisfy my hunger and I believe the best course to achieve that end is to
drink water, I am hardly undertaking a rational decision. Thus, a second
condition is that my belief must be rational; for instance, eating a turkey
sandwich is a rational belief to satisfy my desire. The only requirement for
a rational belief is that it must be grounded in available information. The
decision’s foundation in “the optimal amount of information” is the third
condition in rational choice theory (Elster 23). Information seeking does not
require the belief to be true objectively; it merely requires that the belief is
subjectively true. If I seek information on how best to satisfy my hunger
and, after gathering the information, I am still convinced that water is the
best means to satisfy that end, then I am undertaking a rational decision
(although objectively false). Because of the subjectivity of rationality, “belief
formation is vulnerable to distorting influences of various kinds” (Elster 23).
This vulnerability is important for an economic model that must account for
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rational mistakes in the marketplace.
A related model of choice that also rests upon the assumption of
perfect rationality is the generalized axiom of revealed preferences, or
GARP (Ariely xix). Vilfredo Pareto offered this “revealed preference”
theory to circumvent the limitation of economists in determining individual
motivations. Rather than economists asking each actor in the marketplace
his or her preferences, this model infers the preferences from the actions
(Bruni and Guala 21-49). Pareto assumed that the subjective fact of a person’s
preferences conformed to the objective facet of the given choice.
The assumption of rationality in decision-making is the basis of
Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (Ariely xix-xx). His economic theory,
viewed as the foundation of capitalism, rests on the assumption that, in the
marketplace, the individual uses a cost-benefit analysis of each alternative
to make a decision according to his or her own self-interest. Smith argues
that when each individual acts according to his or her own self-interest,
the economic “pie” expands. When individuals make “mistakes” in their
decisions, acting against their narrow self-interest, market forces and
the “invisible hand” correct them by channeling competition toward
an equilibrium. These positive externalities of an expanding economy
and corrective market forces are not based upon individual generosity or
altruism, but on a rational narrow self-interest. Smith says, “It is not from
the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our
dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not
to their humanity, but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own
necessities, but of their advantages” (Book 1, Chapter 2, Wealth of Nations).
Individuals are held to a high standard—perfection—for their rationality in
the classical model.
In addition to addressing the rational component of choice, the
classical model emphasizes freedom as essential to choice. Classical
economists emphasize negative freedom, purporting that the ultimate role
of the democratic state is to preserve citizens’ capacity for liberty. In other
words, “the state should not limit choices; it should not intervene in the
personal process of preference development and expression” (Ben-Porath,
4). On the economic level, economic libertarians hold free choice as the
ultimate value for market economies. Greenfield writes: “Markets depend
on choice—if we all are free to choose, the market allocates resources to those
who desire them. If choice is limited, the story goes, then people are less able
to satisfy their preferences and thus worse off” (122). Therefore, if an actor
is entirely rational, but is constrained by other agents, then she is unable to
freely choose.
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Criticisms of the Classical Model
The classical model of individual and collective decision-making has
a number of flaws. First, the classical model focuses on lifting barriers to
market interaction, to the neglect of other limiting forces. Greenfield notes
the problems of focusing on the market:
Depending on markets means that if you have few resources, you have
little choice. Also, markets limit choice by making manipulation of our
choice profitable. Markets also put price tags on things we don’t want
to commodify—left to their own devices, markets sweep up all kinds of
things we’d otherwise choose to protect from markets, like babies or kidneys
(3).

Focusing on the market neglects the limits imposed by both the brain and
society.
The brain is a tremendous limit to rationality. Many actions occur
through automation and habit, without a rigorous cost-benefit analysis. By
assuming rationality, the classical model neglects the brain’s own limitations
on rational decision-making. The brain is composed of many structures,
some that analyze and think (the prefrontal cortex), some that create and
store memories (the hippocampus), and some that control automated actions
(the basal ganglia) (Greenfield 49). While this complex structure allows for
humans to multi-task, it is limited. Greenfield writes:
The problem is that the analytic parts of our brains are easily over-taxed,
and you cannot dependably ask them to do more than one thing at a time…
One problem is with how our brain works is that if the prefrontal cortex is
tired or overtaxed or distracted, our basal ganglia take over (51).

As Charles Duhigg notes in The Power of Habit, “Most of the choices we make
each day may feel like the products of well-considered decision-making, but
they’re not. They’re habits” (xvi). He notes that one Duke University study
(2006) finds that more than 40% of actions people perform daily weren’t
actual decisions, but habits (Duhigg xvi). The “autopilot” feature of the basal
ganglia accounts for mistakes in decision-making not recognized by rational
choice theory or the classical model (Greenfield 51). The model neglects
genuine mistakes, such as the “forgotten baby” cases in which mothers forget
their children in a car seat and the child dies from heat. Researchers have
directly linked these cases to the autopilot feature of the brain (Greenfield
51). The classical model is thereby deficient by not recognizing actions that
are taken “in the zone” or on “auto-drive.” It incorrectly recognizes such
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actions as genuine choices and has not reformulated itself to account for
the recent insights into the biological limitations to rational choice. The
model wants to attribute a choice to mothers in this instance, while society
(and juries) recognize the action was not a choice, but a mistake, worthy of
acquittal (Greenfield 52).
Not only are choices in the market place limited by psychology, but
they are also sometimes coerced and involuntary (not choices at all, in other
words). For example, radio host Neal Boortz said that victims of Hurricane
Katrina ought to bear the costs of the devastation. He said that generous
donors were ignoring that victims placed themselves in the devastating
position through their poor decision-making. Boortz said that “poverty is
a behavioral disorder” and “what we saw in New Orleans was poor people
demonstrating the very behavior that made them poor in the first place”
(Greenfield 15). Labeling poverty and the devastation of a hurricane as the
results of individuals’ choices overlooks many limiting factors, including
lack of financial resources, modes of transportation, or forewarning to leave
the city. Greenfield notes, “Most Americans seemed to recognize, in a simple
but profound way, that the victims of the flood had had few real alternatives
and should not be blamed for the ‘choices’ they made” (16). Polls found that
only 22% blamed residents, while the majority blamed the government for
the disaster (Greenfield 16). The classical model, by elevating all actions to
genuine choices, neglects fake choices, or those that lack viable alternatives
Moreover, it has been well documented that individuals do not
follow a path of narrow self-interest, as Smith claims. Numerous empirical
studies on choice negate the assumption of narrow self-interest, as many
individuals make counter-preferential choices, reducing his/her own welfare
for the sake of fairness or other-regarding preferences (Ben-Porath 31-32).
Finally, because the classical model places too high of a burden for a person’s
rational decision process and does not account for social preferences, it fails
to give an adequate descriptive account of individual choice. Behavioral
economists developed in direct response to these deficiencies in the classical
model. Reviewing the behavioral response will offer a more thorough
criticism of the classical model of choice.
The Behavioral Model
Behavioral economics offers an alternative, descriptive model, to
explain individual decision-making. While Smith’s model of capitalism has
been critiqued from almost every angle—most notably Karl Marx’s criticism
in the Communist Manifesto—behavioral economists’concerns pertain to
the assumption of perfect rationality. In fact, the field developed to critique
the assumption that economic agents act according to narrow self-interest
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based upon a rigorous cost-benefit analysis. Amos Tversky and Daniel
Kahneman laid the foundations for behavioral economics, which studies
the psychological limits on an individual’s rational decision-making. As
Dan Ariely proposes in Predictably Irrational, humans have the capacity to
reason, but often fall short of perfect reasoning skills. Empirical evidence,
both in laboratory experiments and in market data analysis, dismembers the
rationality assumption of the classical model.
Behavioral economics un-pillars the assumptions of will power,
self-interest, and rationality in the classical model and suggests that each
are bounded or limited by human’s own psychology. Jolls et al. state that
the task of behavioral economics is “to explore the implications of actual
(not hypothesized) human behavior” (Jolls et al. 1548-1549). Behavioral
economists ask: “How do ‘real people’ differ from homo economicus?” and
offer the notions of bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded
self-interest as answers. First, individuals have bounded willpower,
evidenced in their hyperbolic discounting of events in the future compared
to the present (Laibson 1997). Second, individuals have bounded selfinterest, as they show concerns for fairness and punishment (Camerer &
Thaler 1995). Third, and most important to the task at hand, individuals
have bounded rationality. Empirical evidence of this limit to human reason
include: the self-serving bias (Babcock & Loewenstein 1997); the availability
heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982); the hindsight bias (Fischhoff 1975);
the omission bias (Ritov & Baron 1990); over-optimism (Weinstein 1980); and
the inability to predict experienced utility (Kahneman, 1996). Individuals’
bounded rationality is further evidenced by their loss aversion, meaning
losses hurt more than equivalent gains feel good (Kahneman & Tversky
1979). A related limit is the “endowment effect,” the discrepancy between
an individual’s willingness to pay for an item and their willingness to accept
the same item based on their ownership of the item (Kahneman, Knetsch,
and Thaler 1990).
At the center of this empirical evidence is the individual’s reliance
on heuristics in judgment. For example, individuals experience “mental
contamination” in decision-making. Kahneman and Trversky’s “wheel of
fortune” study asked people to first spin a wheel with numbers 1 to 100 on
it and then to give an estimate of the number of nations in Africa. While the
wheel’s number and the number of nations in Africa are clearly independent
of each other, individuals were anchored to the wheel’s number—they gave
low answers when the wheel’s number was low and high answers when
the number displayed was high (Greenfield 63). Framing effects also bias
individual decision-making. For instance, in a 1982 study, a group of cancer
patients was presented with two surgical options: a surgery with a 90%
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survival rate and another surgery with a 10% mortality rate. Despite the
identical, probabilistic outcomes, the framework induced the patients to favor
the 90% survival rate over the 10% mortality rate (Ben-Porath 30-31). Each of
these phenomena offer the empirical evidence behavioral economists use to
criticize the normative account of classical economists. Because psychological
barriers leave individuals short of perfect rationality, behavioral economists
claim that individuals systematically (and predictably) behave “irrationally”
in their choices. Rather than merely describing individuals’ “irrational”
decision capacity, scholars have suggested that states, businesses, or power
holders can leverage the bounded decision capacity for their own interests.
These scholars suggest leveraging the insights of behavioral economics at the
individual level to promote good externalities on a macro-level.
In addition to criticizing the rationality assumption of the classical
model, behavioral economics focuses on the freedom of choice in society.
While the classical model emphasized negative freedom, or lifting the
barriers for free choice, the behavioral model emphasizes positive freedom,
or the opportunity to act according to a person’s preferred choice (BenPorath 6-7). Even with negative protections of choice, behavioral economists
say choices may not be genuinely free. Cass Sunstein and Signal Ben-Porath
explain that an individual’s freedom of choice is not only limited by her own
psychology, but also by the choice options available in society. The “choice
landscape” or “architecture of choice” of society or the state does not prohibit
an individual taking a certain action, but nonetheless limits human freedom
by “nudging” an individual toward a particular course of action. In this
way, a choice architecture that “nudges” an individual toward a particular
decision is “liberal paternal.” Sunstein says, “A nudge…is any aspect of
the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way
without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic
incentives.” Nudges are paternal because they encourage a particular
choice, and simultaneously liberal because they are not mandates for action
(Sunstein 6). Just as the welfare state created new roles to enhance positive
freedom, the liberal paternal state is a new arena for state intervention since it
is a “choice architect” for citizens. Sunstein explains, “Choice architects can
make major improvements to the lives of others by designing user-friendly
environments” (11).
Importantly, liberal paternalism presumes that whatever efforts the
state takes to offer a neutral space to act, or to provide negative freedom, fail
because the state’s “neutrality” is compromised by the choice landscape it
creates. Sunstein says that it is impossible to construct a “neutral design”
and that the state cannot avoid being choice architects since it naturally
creates the choice menu for its citizenry (Sunstein 3). He writes:
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The libertarian aspect of our strategies lies in the straightforward insistence
that, in general, people should be free to do what they like—and to opt out
of undesirable arrangements if they want to do so…The paternalistic aspect
lies in the claim that it is legitimate for choice architects to try to influence
people’s behavior in order to make their lives longer, healthier, and better…
In our understanding, a policy is ‘paternalistic’ if it tries to influence choices
in a way that will make choosers better off, as judged by themselves [the
choosers]” [Emphasis in Original] (Sunstein 5).

For instance, by forbidding same-sex marriage, the state creates a barrier
for personal relationships. In this way, any state action that deregulates or
regulates personal-social institutions can have “significant consequences in
shaping the landscape of options individuals face in this realm, thus shaping
their identity, their preferences, and their actions” (Ben-Porath 4). From this
perspective, states cannot avoid being paternalistic. They suggest that the
state must harness its propensity for paternalism by not prohibiting choices,
but by “nudging” individuals toward certain outcomes, thereby preserving
an illusory “liberty.” For example, tax credits for children offer incentives for
citizens to bear children. Technically, the individual has the free choice to rear
a child, but the state’s policy might influence one’s choice to have children
or not. In this way, liberal paternal policies shape the choice landscape for
individuals.
Criticisms of the Behavioral Model
In many ways, behavioral economics compensates for the deficiencies
of the classical model by offering a descriptive account of human behavior.
The classical model of self-interest has been disproven by hundreds of
experiments around the world showing (Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer,
Fehr, Gintis, McElreath, Alvard, Barr, Ensminger, Henrich, Hill, GilWhite, Gurven, Marlowe, Patton, and Tracer 2005). The field of behavioral
economics can help economists better predict market behavior, can help the
state create policies that compensate for citizens’ bounded decision capacity,
and can help individuals plan for their own decision shortcomings. Despite
its improvements upon the classical model, behavioral economics has five
fundamental flaws.
First, it uses a methodological individualistic approach to explain
decision-making. By focusing on individuals’ use of heuristics—including
the self-serving bias and availability bias—it discounts how behavior in
the collective can influence a person’s decision to act in a certain manner.
Rather than attributing concerns for fairness in Dictator Games to social
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expectations, it attempts to incorporate these social preferences into an
individual utility model. This approach reduces all social phenomena to
individuals’ irrational decisions, and explains all behavioral regularities
through facts of personal motives, beliefs, and capabilities. This approach
neglects the interaction of these individual facts with larger social norms,
and their influence on motives, beliefs, and capabilities. As the account
of social norms will illustrate, people rarely make decisions in a vacuum;
their decisions are conditioned upon others’ observable choices and inferred
preferences. Recognizing the social context of decision-making is essential
for a proper descriptive account of choice.
A second criticism of the behavioral economics conception of choice
is that it takes agency away from the individual, labeling her behavior as
hopelessly “irrational” without any normative guidance to help her reclaim
her rationality. To be sure, the field does offer its own normative advice:
Sunstein suggests using the insights of behavioral economics to “nudge”
individuals to make good decisions for themselves (6); Ben-Porath suggests
using the findings to create a better educational system and choice landscape
for citizens (16); and Ariely proposes individuals utilize the findings by
correcting their behavior after learning about their frequent “irrational”
mistakes (xxii). Yet, each piece of normative advice concerns avoiding
irrational mistakes rather than positively making rational choices. In fact,
Ben-Porath warns against assuming that all adults have developed the
cognitive tools to enable them to go through a productive process of choice
(147). By describing human behavior as irrational, and presupposing that
individual decision-making is permanently deficient, individuals lose
agency over their rationality. While the field certainly expands the notion
of human rationality beyond narrow self-interest to include other-regarding
preferences (for example, preferences for fairness and punishment), it does
not offer guidance to salvage human rationality. Without a normative
account of choice to reclaim rational choice, rather than to simply avoid
irrational decisions, behavioral economists degrade humans to slaves of their
deficient cognitions.
A third deficiency of behavioral economics concerns liberal
paternalism’s opportunity for free choice. If the state is never able to offer
genuine freedom, because every choice it presents its citizens either limits
the choice landscape or nudges an individual toward a certain option, any
negative prohibition or positive opportunity for liberty becomes irrelevant
for free choice. In the behavioral view, even if the state offers negative
prohibitions of freedom infringement by guaranteeing certain rights and
curtailing its own power, individuals still lack freedom of choice because
of the inherent choice architecture of society. The logical consequence of
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choice architecture is to throw protections of state intervention to the wind,
since they will always be inadequate safeguards for freedom. This result
runs counter to democratic principles that rely on the notion of free choice.
Thus, without any space for freedom, states can justify mounting intrusion
into citizens’ life choices—a sinister prospect.
The fourth deficiency of liberal paternalism in particular is its singular
focus on state limitations of choice, to the exclusion of other limiting agents.
Focusing solely on the state’s limits on choice misses another critical actor
that limits individual liberty: society. Society inherently influences agents’
judgments of their choices. For instance, Ben-Porath cites Charles Dickens’
Oliver Twist and Jane Austen’s Mr. Darcy as examples of characters whose
life choices were largely determined by external social circumstances. Their
life trajectories fit into an “allotted future,” with little room for maneuvering
within their pre-chartered destiny. According to Ben-Porath, “Parental
knowledge and social conventions were considered to be better directives
than one’s own judgment.” In contrast, “the contemporary democratic,
Western sociopolitical structure and ethos…favors choice over destiny.
Freedom, exercised through the choice of a life plan, is the tool for overcoming
the social vision of inherent inequality or structural stratification, such as the
one evident from comparing Oliver Twist with Mr. Darcy” (Ben-Porath 2-3).
While Ben-Porath may be correct in judging contemporary contexts as
less rigid in class structure, allowing for some social mobility, her view
that the current social structure provides space for “a lifetime of choices”
underestimates the societal limitations on individual freedom (144). While
Oliver Twist in contemporary society may have encountered greater freedom
to escape his impoverished destiny as an orphan, and Mr. Darcy would
have been free to marry women of all economic statuses and races, there are
nonetheless tremendous limitations to individual choice in contemporary
society. These limitations are not necessarily enforced by legal sanctions or
by the state’s “liberal paternal” policies, but, rather, by society’s own choice
architecture. While choice may appear to be less restricted in the twenty-first
century compared to the early nineteenth century, declaring it absolutely
free from societal influences is fallacious. As this study shall prove, society
has tremendous influence on individual choice, especially through social
norms. Including society as a limiting agent of choice supports the idea that,
“clearly, choice is bounded by the context in which it occurs and is limited
by the forms of rationality that the choosing individuals can utilize” (BenPorath 126).
Finally, and most importantly, the view of behavioral economists
does not adequately explain large-scale, paradoxical social behavior.
Behavioral economists’ explanations for counter-preferential or other60
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regarding decisions assume that individuals made choices. For instance,
individuals who made poor decisions for their retirement investments were
“naïve” investors (Sunstein 120). This accusation of naïveté, alongside the
accusation of irrationality, rests on the assumption of an active choice model.
The theory uses psychological heuristics to prove the deficiency of human
rationality, but nonetheless attributes the decision to the individual’s own
decision capacity. An individual may have been naïve or irrational in her
decision, but it was nonetheless her choice.
The behavioral account neglects a third mode of decision-making,
which ought to be considered alongside the classical rigorous conception
and the deficient behavioral conception, to explain paradoxical decisions.
Both the classical and behavioral accounts miss the possibility that actions
are taken not due to an inherent flaw in the system or in the mind, but due
to laziness or the desire for conformity. Non-choices are not caused by
deficient rationalities, nor are they “mistakes” to be corrected by an invisible
hand in the marketplace. Rather, non-choices are characterized by a lack
of thought or a counter-preferential selection among the choice options. A
proper descriptive model of collective decision-making must account for
those individuals who do not think, but nonetheless still behave and survive
in society. It must also consider those people who behave against their own
preferences. Accounting for these two types of decisions builds upon the
behavioral model by offering a better explanation for paradoxical social
phenomena.
A New Conception of Choice
A new conception of choice must avoid the pitfalls of both the
classical model, by not assuming the constancy of human rationality, and
the shortcomings of the behavioral model, by not labeling the individual as
deficient in her capacity to choose. The new construction of choice must
reintegrate reason into an individuals’ decision-making capacity. It must
also recognize society as a limiting agent to liberty, while offering a space for
freedom outside of any external restriction. Importantly, the reconstruction
must be descriptive—accurately describing human behavior—and
normative—offering individuals who appear deficient in their decision
processes an opportunity to reclaim their rationality and freedom in choice.
Most importantly, a thorough definition of choice accounts for the
critical deficiency in the classical and behavioral models, neither of which offer
a clear answer to the question: what is choice? In the classical model, decisions
are assumed to be choices, neglecting any automated or constrained actions.
In the behavioral model, decisions are assumed to always be limited choices,
limited by psychology and the choice environment, but choices nonetheless.
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Redefining choices in the active sense enhances the behavioral model by
labeling those “irrational” decisions in more precise and dignifying ways.
Choice, as I shall define it, is the sequential process of thought, will,
and action. Before analyzing each step separately, it is important to note
that each element is necessary and independently insufficient to constitute a
choice. The process is also linear: thought preceding will and will preceding
action. The absence of any element or the misalignment of any single element
in the process constitutes a non-choice. Delineating the steps of choice offers
the foundation to its counterpart, non-choice.
The Choice Process
Thought
Rationality is viewed as a pre-condition for choice—granting
individuals the autonomy to discern their preferences, even before they are
given the opportunity to act upon those preferences. As Ben-Porath says,
“Decisions made through proper choosing processes are deemed justified
and legitimate” (5). Since heuristics are considered irrational “choosing
processes,” the new conception of choice must include a proper, rational
process of determining one’s preferences to render the choice legitimate.
The proper process is thought. Thought is a type of self-dialogue, a process
of rumination. Hannah Arendt’s thorough description of thought will serve
as the basis for understanding the process. For Arendt, thought has four
primary characteristics: it is inactive; it is distinct from knowledge; it deals
with invisibles, out of the world of appearances; and it is solitary.
Thinking’s first characteristic is that it paralyzes physical action,
requiring the ability to stop and think (Responsibility and Judgment 176).
Arendt writes:
Thinking’s chief characteristic is that it interrupts all doing, all ordinary
activities no matter what they happen to be…. For it is true that the moment
we start thinking on no matter what issue we stop everything else, and this
everything else, again whatever it may happen to be, interrupts the thinking
process; it is as though we moved into a different world (Responsibility and
Judgment 165).

Thus, in the choice process, thought must be separated from action, since
action is destructive for the activity of thinking. This distinction also lifts the
burden of constantly thinking, as Arendt does not suggest that thinking is a
continuous activity since action necessarily interrupts it.
A second facet of thought is its distinction from knowledge. Like
Kant, Arendt distinguishes between thinking and knowing by separating
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reason from intellect. Reason is the urge to think and to understand, while
intellect seeks verifiable knowledge (Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment
163). Thinking is therefore a rational process by definition, since it involves
logical reasoning, rather than serving as the storehouse of facts and
knowledge. The consequence of the distinction from knowledge is that only
thought can satisfy the need to think, rather than any functional accumulation
of knowledge. Arendt says, “the thought which I had yesterday will satisfy
this need today only to the extent that I can think them anew” (Responsibility
and Judgment 163). A thinking individual must continually stop and think
in order to satisfy her desire.
A third facet of Arendt’s thought is that it deals with invisibles,
outside of the world of appearances (Responsibility and Judgment 167). This
is not to say that thinking must only concern concept or ideas, only that when
it does concern physical objects, they must be outside of the immediate sense
perception. Arendt says, “to think about somebody who is present implies
removing ourselves surreptitiously from his company and acting as though
he were no longer there” (Responsibility and Judgment 165). More often
than not, sensory experiences provide food for thought that occurs later.
The final facet of thought is that it is solitary—an idea closely related
to the stop and think component of thinking. Michael Sandel conceives of
moral arguments as a dialectic between one’s judgments about particular
situations and the principles one affirms upon reflection; however, he also
conceives of moral reflection as a public endeavor, rather than a solitary
pursuit. His justification is that moral reflection requires an interlocutor, a
Socrates of sort, who can put pressure upon one’s convictions (Sandel 28-29).
Yet thinking in this manner would merely reinforce principles defined by
society, especially if the interlocutor comes from the same political and social
constructs as the individual. For this reason, thinking necessarily must take
place in solitude—acting as one’s own interlocutor—in order to properly
judge the social norms in play. Solitude is not loneliness:
Solitude means that though alone, I am together with somebody (myself,
that is). It means that I am two-in-one, whereas loneliness as well as
isolation do not know this kind of schism, this inner dichotomy in which
I can ask questions of myself and receive answers (Arendt, Responsibility
and Judgment 98).

Solitude, then, offers a forum for a silent dialogue of myself with myself.
Arendt suggests that solitude can be interrupted by exhaustion or by
other people. In the modern era, social media, technology, and other
communication devices must be added to the list of disruptive forces.
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Whatever the disruptive force, the self-dialogue in solitude “shuns the
multitude” (Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment 103).
While it may seem obvious that thinking should preface a genuine
choice, thought as defined by Arendt proves that it is difficult to achieve.
Thinking places many obligations on a person—she must remove herself
from society, she must stop all other activities, and she must think on objects
not in her direct sense perception, but on phenomena outside her senses or
on metaphysical questions. She must not engage in thinking for a functional,
practical purpose to generate knowledge, but to think for thinking’s sake.
These stringent requirements on thought explain why, according to Arendt,
“Thinking, the quest for meaning—rather than the scientist’s thirst for
knowledge for its own sake—can be felt to be ‘unnatural,’ as though men,
when they begin to think engage in some activity contrary to the human
condition” (165). It feels unnatural because individuals so rarely engage in
thought of this sort.
An example of thought illustrates its rigor and hints at its potential
benefits. Sandel describes an Arendtian form of thought that deals with
intangibles: the moral dilemma hypothetical. Like Arendt, Sandel describes
thought as an engagement in mental aerobics, but specifies that the activity
involve moral quandaries—concepts outside of the world of appearances.
For instance, Sandel presents the popular “trolley” thought experiment,
which compels the thinker to discern the moral difference between pushing
a man in front of trolley to save five people and pushing a lever to redirect
the trolley, saving five but killing one as a result of the redirection. The moral
quandary to save five at the expense of one compels the individual to discern
his preference for utilitarianism—sacrificing one for the sake of five—or
deontology—not intentionally pushing a person into harm’s way. As Sandel
says, “By setting aside contingencies—‘What if the workers noticed the
trolley and jumped aside in time?’—hypothetical examples help us to isolate
the moral principles at stake and examine their force” (22-24). By thinking
through hypothetical moral dilemmas, individuals engage in thinking not
for a functional purpose, but to sort out their own moral convictions. They
help determine their preferences for diverging moral principles.
Thinking on a moral dilemma satisfies the conditions of Arendtian
thought: it is inactive and requires the individual to stop and think; it is
not undertaken for a functional purpose to acquire knowledge; and it
concerns intangible concepts in the hypothetical realm. Indeed, “This way
of conceiving moral arguments, as a dialectic between our judgments about
particular situations and the principles we affirm on reflection, has a long
tradition. It goes back to the dialogues of Socrates and the moral philosophy
of Aristotle” (Sandel 28).
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Despite its rigor, incorporating this laborious process of thinking
into the choice model has a number of benefits. First, while Arendt claims
that thinking is not the handmaiden of knowledge and that it is “resultless
by nature” (Responsibility and Judgment 166-167), it nonetheless serves
the practical purpose of preparing the individual for a choice by creating
preferences on which to act. This factor is not in contradiction with Arendt’s
theory, since she acknowledges the preparatory nature of thought and
that preparation is neither a tangible product nor a type of knowledge.
Preferences must be determined at the level of thought in order to avoid
the pitfalls of revealed-preference theory, which infers preferences from an
action. Revealed preference theory does not account for counter-preferential
choices, or when an individual acts against her own desires and beliefs.
Since this concept is empirically disproven, and preferences are often
misaligned with actions, they must instead be determined at the solitary,
inactive stage of thought. Thinking offers the potential energy for action by
generating preferences. As in the revealed preference and the behavioral
models, preferences precede the action in a choice. Preferences prepare
action by creating desires, beliefs, or inclinations for decisions. For example,
I must think about my preference for a certain type of food in order to decide
my lunch order from a restaurant menu. In the trolley experiment, I must
determine my preference for utilitarianism in order to choose to save five
at the expense of one. Thus, preparation to act is the practical function of
thinking.
Preferences determined at the level of thinking can take many
forms and need not be impermeable. On the contrary, because the desire to
think can only be satisfied by the activity of thinking, thinking demands a
continuous inner dialogue and revision process. Sandel’s description of the
process of thinking on the moral dilemma requires starting with a conviction
or opinion on the right thing to do, reflecting on the reason for the conviction,
and determining the principle on which it is based. He writes:
Then, confronted with a situation that confounds the principle, we ar
pitched into confusion: “I thought it was always right to save as many lives
as possible, and yet it seems wrong to push the man off the bridge (or to
kill the unarmed goat-herds).” Feeling the force of that confusion, and the
pressure to sort it out, is the impulse to philosophy. Confronted with this
tension, we may revise the judgment about the right thing to do, or rethink
the principle we initially espoused. As we encounter new situations, we
move back and forth between our judgments and our principles, revising
each in light of the other (Sandel, 28).
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Rather than leaving an agent unprepared, this revisionary process of
preferences affords the individual tools and moral principles to use for
her decisions and actions. Sandel says, “wrestling with their dilemmas
sheds light on the way moral argument can proceed, in our personal lives
and in the public sphere” (27). Significantly, because thinking is solitary,
this toolkit is internally defined rather than externally imposed, rendering
the ultimate decision her own. Society or the state does not determine the
justificatory principles of a moral dilemma because it is unable to interfere
in the revisionary process of thought. Moreover, thinking helps a person to
revise her preferences at different life stages. Peoples’ preferences can adapt
to their maturing worldview.
Thinking is preparatory for Arendt in another way: it prepares the
individual for action among a plurality of people by creating roots. Thinking
and remembering is the human way to strike roots in the world, according to
Arendt (Responsibility and Judgment 100). She writes:
For human beings, thinking of past matters means moving in the dimension
of depth, striking roots and thus stabilizing themselves, so as not to be swept
away by whatever may occur…The greatest evildoers are those who don’t
remember because they have never given thought to the matter, and, without
remembrance, nothing can hold them back (Responsibility and Judgment
95).

Thinking prepares for just actions by grounding the individual in a world
of remembrance. The nuances between individuals’ preferences strike roots
for an individual to be distinct among many in society, while simultaneously
connecting him to those with similar tastes and aversions. Similar
preferences connect individuals to one another, which may either encourage
an individual to avoid evil and do good with those of similar preferences,
or to do evil and avoid good with those of dissimilar preferences. By
offering roots grounded in the emotions of guilt, fear, and sorrow, thinking
deters actions with consequences that may strike those emotional chords.
While Arendt focuses on the avoidance of evil by striking roots, thinking
also has implications for altruistic actions, by creating roots in memories of
happiness, generosity, and human goodness. By offering memories of these
events and allowing an individual to ruminate on the emotional memory, an
individual may be motivated to recreate the altruistic feelings again through
his choices. In this way, thinking prepares an individual for good actions as
well as avoiding evil actions.
Another benefit to incorporating this rigorous thought process into
the choice model is that thinking is universally accessible because it is distinct
66

SPICE | Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Undergraduate Journal

Lauren M. Harding
from knowledge. Knowledge is interwoven with access to education, life
experiences, and the capacity for remembering facts. Thinking, on the other
hand, does not deal with measurable facts. Arendt says, “the faculty of
thinking, as distinguished from the thirst for knowledge, must be ascribed
to everybody; it cannot be a privilege of the few” (Arendt, Responsibility
and Judgment 166). Thus, thinking preserves the humanity of individuals
who appear unintelligent or “irrational” in the market setting. Behavioral
economists can no longer label the masses as irrational, since every person
retains the capacity to think, whatever her level of knowledge. While
it is universally accessible, it is still not as frequent as Socrates supposed,
according to Arendt—“No doubt I can refuse to think and to remember
and still remain quite normally human” (Responsibility and Judgment, 94).
Thus, while thought is universally accessible, it is not necessarily universally
utilized. However, when dealing with questions of morality, the capacity
for thought must be universal. Arendt says, “If the ability to tell right
from wrong should have anything to do with the ability to think, then we
must be able to ‘demand’ its exercise in every sane person no matter how
erudite or ignorant, how intelligent or stupid he may prove to be” (Arendt,
Responsibility and Judgment 164).
The most significant benefit of thought is the salvation of an
individual’s rationality and freedom of choice. Rationality in choice is
salvaged due to the preparation for discernment in moral dilemmas.
According to Beauchamp and Childress:
The virtue of discernment brings sensitive insight, astute judgment, and
understanding to action. Discernment involves the ability to make fitting
judgments and reach decisions without being unduly influenced by
extraneous considerations, fears, personal attachments, and the like (40).

Closely related to this concept is Aristotle’s phronesis, or practical wisdom.
A person who has practical wisdom is able to apply his values to particular
circumstances, “while keeping emotions within proper bounds” and acting
“with a proper balance of reason and desire” (Beauchamp and Childress
40). Thinking, then, is not purely “rational” as the classical model presumes,
but allows for emotions, personal values, and desires to come into a choice.
Because discernment is the result of a rigorous thought process of applying
generalized rules, values, or morals to particular cases, it is not devoid of
emotions. In other words, by preparing an individual to discern rather
simply to prefer, thinking infuses reason into emotional choices. This
addition enhances the role of thought in the choice process, because otherregarding preferences, such as altruism or spite, can remain rational choices.
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Preferences based on narrow-self interest preclude such emotional social
preferences, while discernment incorporates a broader range of choice
options.
Moreover, thought reincorporates freedom into the choice model by
its distinction from knowledge. Knowledge limits an individual’s freedom
of choice since it is quantifiable and absolute and often dependent upon
access to education. Behavioral economists propose learning about heuristic
pitfalls to avoid them in decisions, rendering a decision free of psychological
constraints. However, because this knowledge is only accessible to those with
access to behavioral economics courses or textbooks, free choice is reserved
for only the educated elite by this account. The universal access to thought
over knowledge allows any individual to have the capacity for free choice.
Thinking offers a space for unlimited freedom of engagement. As Kant
said, the separation of knowledge and thinking “eliminated the obstacles by
which reason hinders itself” (Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment 164).
Will

Perhaps the most contentious aspect of the choice process is the
notion of a will. Philosophers and psychologists fiercely debate whether
humans possess a will, whether it is distinct from other cognitive processes,
and whether actions can even be attributed to a particular will. Rather than
outlining the complex debate, the description of will here will be brief,
although admittedly incomplete. In the new conception of choice, the will
is the bridge from thought to action. The will brings the solitary process of
thought into reality. The will signals the direction for the potential energy of
thought, transforming the speed of action into a velocity of choice. Arendt
asks, “Does reason then command the will?” (Responsibility and Judgment
71). Reason in this account does not command the will, but prepares the will
to offer direction for action.
The “conscious” is a useful concept to help describe the role of the
will in the bridge of choice. While no definition of conscience is unmet by
controversy, Beauchamp and Childress offer a moderate explanation of
conscious, “An individual acts conscientiously if he or she is motivated to
do what is right because it is right, has tried with due diligence to determine
what is right, intends to do what is right, and exerts an appropriate level
of effort to do so” (43). In this description of the conscious, thought is the
“due diligence” of determining what is right, the will is the motivation or
intention to do what is judged as right, and the action is the level of effort
to act upon that judgment. The will, then, can be seen as an intention to
align the thought with the action. This notion aligns with Kant’s account of
the conscience, which he views as a “compass” derived from pure practical
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reason (Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment xxii).
A few points from John Searle’s complex analysis of intentionality
are noteworthy to understand the notion of will. First, a person may intend
an action without the conditions of its satisfaction. For instance, Hamlet
may intend to kill his stepfather, Claudius, but fail to satisfy that intention.
Second, a person may intend an action but must do so in the right way.
Hamlet may intend to avenge his father’s death by murdering his murderer,
but if Claudius had died of a heart attack, the satisfaction of the intention was
not conducted in the right way. Third, Searle distinguishes actions with prior
intentions from intentional actions. For example, Hamlet may be giving a
soliloquy and pace about the room, an intentional action to move around, but
conducted without prior thought. On the other hand, Hamlet may develop
his intentions prior to his actions, as in the case of thinking about poisoning
his stepfather. In the first case, Hamlet was acting intentionally; in the latter
his action had prior intentions. The current account of the will in choice
is concerned with actions developed with prior intentions, since choice
necessitates a thought process that precedes an action. These intentions
are derived from the preferences created in the thought process. Finally,
Searle notes that there exists a causal connection between prior intentions
and intention in action. These elements are causally self-referential, since the
action is caused by the prior intention, rather than made through impulse or
lack of thought (Searle 79-94). Any “accidents” in actions are not intentional
and are thus neither choices nor non-choices. They are simply mistakes
outside of the choice/non-choice models.
Central to the definition of choice is the alignment of thought, will,
and action. The will must gain direction from the solitary, self-reflexive
activity of thought. My will must not be directed toward exogenous ideas
or gain direction without the necessary precondition of thought to be
considered a choice. For example, if I think about kicking a soccer ball, and I
am motivated to kick the ball and subsequently direct my action toward that
intention, I have made a choice (however successful I am in the endeavor).
If, however, I merely kick the ball out of a knee-jerk reaction, I have acted out
of impulse or reflex without thought or intention; I have not made a choice.
Thus, the will must direct the action in the path carved out by the waves of
thought.
Separating thought, will, and action leaves the will intact when a
person fails to produce the intended result (an accident) or acts against her
own self-interest (a counter-preferential decision). Separating the intention
from action also accounts for the flaws in revealed preference theory, where
actions may not in fact align with the individual preferences. Critically,
the will must not allow society, norms, customs, or exogenous agents to
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impose the direction in order to be a genuinely free choice. I can intend to
act according to outside purposes—conforming to a social norm or rule—
but that intention is not grounded in a self-defined preference. For this
reason, freedom and rationality must not reside in the will, since one can
intentionally act according to external social influences. Rather, freedom and
rationality in choice must reside in the solitary thought process, insulated
from outside dictates. To make a decision, one can intentionally act; however,
to make a free choice, the intention must be self-defined and aligned with the
preferences created in thought.
Action

Action is the kinetic step of choice, prepared by thought and given
direction by the will. Action, as defined here, is similar to Arendt’s conception
since it is defined in opposition to thought, but unique from Arendtian action,
as genuine freedom remains in the activity of thinking rather than in action.
Jerome Kohn describes Arendt’s concept of action:
Thinking is self-reflexive, whereas an agent can act only with others than
himself and the activity of thinking, which takes place in solitude, stops
when a thinker begins to act, just as the activity of acting, which requires
the company of others, stops when an agent begins to think with himself
[Emphasis in Original] (Kohn, Responsibility and Judgment, xxi).

Arendt believed freedom was actualized in the process of initiation—not the
result of the action, but the beginning of the act itself (The Human Condition
9). Thus, in both this account and Arendt’s account, freedom occurs before
the action itself.
Key to this account of action as the final node of a free choice is that
it is distinct from behavior. Kohn elaborates:
The distinguishing mark of Arendt’s conception of action, as opposed to
behavior, is that it is its own end. Because the goals set by some agents
inevitably conflict with those set by others, the meaning of action, if it has
any, must lie within itself (Responsibility and Judgment xxiii).

Thus, individuals’ actions must have self-created goals or preferences. Actions
must not be rule-defined, since “there is nothing unique about adhering
to those rules” and they must not do good for the sake of appearing good
(Kohn, Responsibility and Judgment xxiv). When goals are set by others, or
“exogenously” defined, the person is behaving. Only endogenously, or selfmade, defined preferences can direct genuine actions.
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This distinction of action and behavior is essential for the definition
of choice because it sets the groundwork for non-choice. Behavior is ruledefined, without thought, and directed toward exogenous goals. Action, on
the other hand, is fully aligned with thought and will. This tripartite choice
alignment is not intended for outside purposes—such as creating a maxim
for others’ action in Kant’s categorical imperative; rather, the alignment is
for the individual’s own purposes, the meaning lying within itself. A person
does not contradict his or herself in order to create a universally valid law,
but in order to preserve her freedom and rationality for her own purposes
(Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment 69).
While thought and will are essential steps in a free choice, action
is equally as essential. Importantly, just as thought created the roots for
remembering, “Action, in so far as it engages in founding and preserving
political bodies, creates the condition for remembrance, that is, for history”
(Arendt, The Human Condition 9). These conditions for remembrance are a
direct result of the fact that, in opposition to the solitary activity of thinking,
the activity of action “cannot even be imagined outside the society of men”
(Arendt, The Human Condition 22). Thus, action requires the plurality of
others’ actions. Arendt explains:
The vita activa, human life in so far as it is actively engaged in doing
some thing, is always rooted in a world of men and of man-made things
which it never leaves or altogether transcends. Things and men form the
environment for each of man’s activities, which then would be pointless
without such location; yet this environment, the world into which we are
born, would not exist without the human activity which produced it, as in
the case of fabricated things (The Human Condition 22).

Because “only action is entirely dependent upon the constant presence of
others,” freedom must not reside in action, contrary to Arendt’s belief
(The Human Condition 23). The presence of others necessarily limits free
choice—either through the choice architecture of society, or through social
institutions like the state or culture. Thus, when a person makes a choice,
it must be preconditioned by thought and will, since action is necessarily a
social endeavor.
To make a genuine self-defined, free, rational choice, one must
preface her action with the process of solitary self-dialogue and her intention
must be grounded in that reflexive self-talk. Only after those conditions
are met can the individual act in conjunction with her thoughts and will.
This plurality of human action is the most important component of the reconception of choice for the purpose of understanding the notion of nonchoice.
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Benefits of the Model
One benefit of the new conception of choice is that it is simultaneously
solitary and social; thought must happen in a vacuum while action necessarily
occurs in plurality. An individual choice must be endogenously defined, or,
in other words, no external agents can interfere with the tri-partite process
of choice. A person legislates her own actions by creating self-defined
preferences and directing her will toward satisfying those preferences. An
individual must think for herself, will for her own purposes, and act upon
her own preferences to freely choose. The solitary nature of the thinking
process preserves individual rationality and freedom. Even amid external
limitations on action, individuals retain the freedom to think and every
individual has access to her faculties of reason. Thus, the new conception
safeguards individual freedom and rationality in the thinking process.
Moreover, the most important benefit of the new definition of choice
is that it offers an avenue to understand non-choice without accusations
of “irrationality” and without having to infer preferences through actions.
Rather, because the will may be misdirected or the action limited by outside
forces, it is easy to see how individuals can make “counter-preferential”
decisions. Without thought to establish an individual’s preferences, she
may rely too heavily on norms, customs, and dictates to guide her actions.
Additionally, without the will in alignment with the preferences determined
in the thought process, it is easy to see how an individual can direct decisions
for others. She may be overly concerned with the appearance of her action or
for the desire to conform to others’ actions. Thus, there are many roadblocks
in the choice process that can descriptively explain “irrational” behavior or
“counter-preferential” decisions. The rigor of the tripartite choice process
offers new avenues to explain collective behavior that, on the surface, lacks
logical explanations.
Non-Choice
Non-choice is the negative conception of choice and is defined in two
ways. First, it can be a decision made without thought. Individuals acting
according to a custom or heuristic are not engaging in a choice because they
are allowing the custom or heuristic to substitute for their individual thought.
Second, non-choice can be a misalignment of the processes of choice. If an
individual goes through a rigorous thought process, but her will directs her
action away from endogenously defined preferences, she engages in nonchoice. Thus, counter-preferential choices are not, in fact, choices, but nonchoices.
Mill, Arendt, and Kant’s philosophies of liberty offer additional
support for these two conceptions of non-choice. Mill offers insight into the
72

SPICE | Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Undergraduate Journal

Lauren M. Harding
first conception and redefines conformity as a non-choice: “Forcing a person
to live according to custom or convention or prevailing opinion is wrong,
Mill explains, because it prevents him from achieving the highest end of
human life—the full and free development of his human faculties” (Sandel
51). Thus, conforming to customs or conventions is a type of non-choice
because it lacks thought. As Mill writes:
The human faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative feeling, mental
activity, and even moral preference, are exercised only in making a choice.
He who does anything because it is the custom, makes no choice. He gains
no practice either in discerning or in desiring what is best. The mental and
moral, like the muscular powers, are improved only by being used…He who
lets the world or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no
need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses
his plan for himself, employs all his faculties (Sandel 51).

Thus, anything done according to custom, without individual thought or
use of “muscular powers,” is a non-choice. Mill concedes that following
convention can lead a person to be superficially satisfied and prevent him
from harm. But, he asks, “What will be his comparative worth as a human
being? It really is of importance, not only what men do, but also what
manner of men they are that do it” (Sandel 51). Thus, engaging in non-choice
degrades a person’s humanity.
Hannah Arendt’s conception of non-thinking also corresponds to
the concept of non-choice as a lack of thought. She writes:
[Thinking] may have a paralyzing effect when you come out of it, no longer
sure of what had seemed to you beyond doubt while you were unthinkingly
engaged in whatever you were doing. If your action consisted in applying
general rules of conduct to particular cases in ordinary life, then you will
find yourself paralyzed because no such rules can withstand the wind of
thought (Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment 176).

Thus, conforming to a general rule of conduct is only possible through a
lack of thought. By its very definition, thinking paralyzes choosing for
conformity’s sake. Arendt describes the dangers of non-thinking guiding
action:
By shielding people against the dangers of examination, it teaches them
to hold fast to whatever the prescribed rules of conduct may be at a given
time in a given society. When people then get used to is not so much the
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content of the rules, a close examination of which would always lead
them into perplexity, as the possession of rules under which to subsume
particulars (Responsibility and Judgment 176).

In other words, non-thinkers subscribe to a rule not for its particular content,
but in order to hold fast to a prescribed rule of conduct. Non-thinkers
engage in non-choice by allowing the system to choose on their behalf.
This conception of non-thinking non-choice does not dispute individual
preferences that have society at heart—for justice or equality, for instance—
but, rather, describes those decisions that are motivated by social conformity.
Kant sheds light on the second definition of non-choice. For Kant, the
opposite of autonomy is heteronomy, in which an individual acts “according
to determinations outside of herself” (Sandel 109). Sandel writes that, for
Kant:
When we act heteronomously, we act for the sake of ends given outside us.
We are instruments, not authors, of the purposes we pursue….[in contrast],
when we act autonomously, according to the law we give ourselves, we do
something for its own sake, as an end in itself. We cease to be instruments of
purposes given outside us. This capacity to act autonomously is what gives
human life its special dignity. It marks out the difference between persons
and things (110).

Thus, any exogenously defined goal is not an autonomous choice, but a
heteronomous non-choice because it is directed for purposes outside of the
individual. Conformity for the sake of conformity, then, is a non-choice.
When the state or society directs the individual’s will, it misaligns the choice
process and renders the decision a non-choice. Again, this conception of
non-choice does not judge the correctness of an individual’s preferences,
but merely describes a decision conditionally motivated for purposes of
conformity as a non-choice.
Finally, non-choices are banal behavior. Banal behavior aggregated
across many individuals in society can lead to both horrific and fantastic
consequences. Collective banal behavior, soon to be defined as social norms,
can lead to a banality of evil or a banality of goodness in society. Non-choice
may seem inconsequential on an individual level, but it grows in significance
with a sufficiently large population of non-choosers.
Social Norms
Social norms are informal rules of behavior. This study shall
redefine them as the aggregation of individual non-choices, as previously
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defined. Cristina Bicchieri provides a comprehensive definition of social
norms from which to launch this reformulation. It is helpful to understand
what social norms are not before outlining what they are. Social norms
are not private norms, or those “self-imposed rules that people construct
to overcome weakness of will” because those are not observable to others
nor contingent upon others’ approval (Elster 24). Social norms are also not
habits or automated actions, since habits are private, idiosyncratic, and are
not dependent upon others’ opinions (Elster 25). They are distinguished
from legal rules as well, since the behavior is neither formally sanctioned
nor enforced by exogenous entities. Thus, any enforcement of the norm
is informal and based entirely on expectations of conformity (Bicchieri 8).
Often, aside from etiquette books like Emily Post’s Etiquette, social norms
are not made explicit. Rather, they are informal, meaning they exist without
being written down or codified, making social norms particularly difficult to
study.
Social norms focus on behavior in collection, rather than on
individual behavior. Private, routine patterns of behavior or habits, such as
brushing my teeth after mealtimes, do not fall under social norms because
they are not motivated by expectations of others (Bicchieri 9). In contrast,
collective behaviors that are norm-driven intertwine an individual’s motive
to act with preferences of conforming to others’ actions. For example, a social
norm exists in America to tip 20% of the total restaurant bill. This norm
is informal, since it is typically not automatically included in the bill, and
prescriptive, since it is not a prohibition on acting, but a positive instruction
to act. Moreover, the norm varies by location, as a 20% tip in Europe would
be unheard of just as a 0% tip in America would be extremely rude behavior.
This indicates that the behavior is collectively motivated, since individual
behavior varies by location and culture. In examining this type of collective
behavior, the question becomes: are people endogenously motivated to
engage in the same behavior or exogenously motivated by observing others’
behavior collectively? In other words, are people engaging in the same action
because of individual motivations (i.e. everyone brushes their teeth for the
same endogenous reason of having good oral hygiene), or are they engaging
in the same action because of collective motivations (i.e. everyone tips 20% in
the U.S. for the exogenous reason to comply with the social etiquette)?
In order to understand collective behavior, one cannot simply refer
to the behavior, since that dismisses the motive of the behavior, nor can one
simply refer to expectations of behavior, since people can place different
expectations on themselves and others. Rather, social norms are constituted
by the complex interplay of expectations and actions. An example is best
suited to unraveling the complex definition of social norms. Let’s take
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the New Mexican tradition of setting out luminarias on Christmas Eve.
Luminarias, sometimes called farolitos, are small paper lanterns, usually
made with a candle set in sand inside a brown paper bag, that are set out in
front of homes on Christmas Eve in New Mexico. The tradition of setting
luminarias in rows along my sidewalk is contingent upon my understanding
that this tradition only occurs in a particular situation, on Christmas Eve. I
have a conditional preference to conform to this tradition based on both my
empirical expectations and normative expectations of the behavior. Empirical
expectations are the beliefs that others also engage in a certain behavior.
This necessitates observation of others’ behavior. For instance, if I observe
a large enough subset of my New Mexican community placing luminarias
out on Christmas Eve 2011(my entire neighborhood, for example), I have an
empirical expectation that they will do so again this Christmas Eve 2012. In
order to conform, I must also have either normative expectations or normative
expectations with sanctions. My normative expectations are that I believe
that most, if not all, of my neighbors expect me to conform to the luminaria
tradition. I may have normative expectations with sanctions if I believe that
I will not be invited to the annual neighborhood association luncheon if I do
not conform to the norm. Thus, I have a conditional preference to conform
to the behavior rule of placing luminarias out on Christmas Eve, because I
expect others to do the same and I believe others expect the same of me. This
distinction between empirical and normative expectations also distinguishes
social norms from descriptive norms, such as fashions or fads. I may want to
wear the latest fashion because I observe others wearing the latest trend (i.e.
empirical expectations), but not because of my belief that others expect me to
be trendy (i.e. normative expectations) (Bicchieri 2).
The example of the luminaria social norm may seem mundane,
but it illustrates my conformity to a collective behavior that is against my
individual self-interest initially. From an individually rational perspective,
the costs of setting out luminarias, including the material costs of the bags,
sand, and candles, and the opportunity cost of time, outweigh the benefit,
as I do not engage in the behavior for religious purposes and prefer to stay
inside to avoid the winter cold, thereby willingly foregoing the benefit of
seeing the beautifully lit lanterns. Individual rationality dictates that I should
not partake in an activity in which the costs are greater than the benefits.
Yet, each winter you can find me partaking in this costly behavior. Am I
irrational?
Social norms offer salvation for my rationality. They do so by
transforming a mixed-motive game into a coordination game (Bicchieri 3).
Individually, I do not want to partake in a behavior that imposes greater
costs than rewards. Collectively, however, I conditionally prefer to conform
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to the behavior. For instance, according to a narrow self-interest, I prefer
not to contribute money to purchase a retirement gift for a co-worker with
a colleague. This mixed-motive game can be represented in a Prisoner’s
Dilemma, one-shot game:
Game 1: Mixed-Motive
Person B
Cooperate Defect
		
Person A
		
		

Cooperate
Defect

5,5

0,10

10,0

2,2

If my colleague and I both defect from contributing money to the gift, we both
receive a low payoff, since the colleague is upset. Our payoff is still positive
because we did not have to take the time and money to purchase a gift. If
we both cooperate, we split the cost of the gift equally. However, the best
situation for either Person A or Person B is for the other person to cooperate,
while she herself defects. In other words, I want my colleague to contribute
100% of the gift’s costs, while I still reap the social benefit of giving a kind
gift. In this narrow self-interested game, defection is the dominant strategy
for both Person A and B. Mutual defection is the Nash Equilibrium.
Social norms fix this dilemma by increasing the payoffs for cooperation while
reducing the benefits of defection. The new one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma
is a cooperation game rather than a mixed-motive game, thereby making
cooperation (i.e. conformity to the norm) the dominant strategy.
Game 2: Coordination
		
			
		
		
Person A
		
		

Person B
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate
Defect

10,10

10,0

0,10

1,1

With these payoffs, if a social norm of gift giving exists when a colleague
retires, and Person A and Person B both have empirical expectations that
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the other will contribute to the giftand normative expectations that they are
expected to contribute (or that they will be informally sanctioned if they do
not contribute), mutual cooperation is the equilibrium. Thus, it becomes
rational to conform and contribute to the gift when a social norm is in place.
In this way, social norms offer reasons to conform based on informal
social sanctions or rewards. It is rational to conform if the costs or rewards
outweigh the benefits. However, simply because it is rational to conform to a
behavior in the presence of a social norm does not make the action a product
of free choice. Social norms are not the collection of irrational decisions,
but the aggregation of individual non-choices. Non-choices, as defined by
a disjunction of thought, will, and action, occur when an individual acts
according to an exogenously defined preference. Choices are based on
preferences that are not conditional upon others’ actions. Social norms are by
definition the collection of non-choices because individuals have conditional
preferences over their actions. They act not for their own sake, but for the
sake of others’ expectations and behavior.
Bicchieri distinguishes between two methods of decision-making—
deliberative and behavioral rules—which clarifies the ways social norms fit
into the classical and behavioral models. Rational choice models support the
deliberative route of decision-making. This route emphasizes that individuals
assess a situation, gather information, list the possible consequences of
different actions, assess the probability of each consequence occurring, and
then calculate the expected utility of each alternative action (Bicchieri 4).
While this is the only type of decision process in the classical model, the
behavioral model recognizes the descriptive deficiency of this method, since
individuals are limited by their own psychology and rely on heuristics and
defaults to inform their choices. My decision to conform to the luminaria
tradition demonstrates my divergence from the rational choice model of
deliberation, as each winter I fail to undergo this rigorous mental calculation
of lighting the lanterns. Yet, my actions are nonetheless intentional and do
not suffer from deficiencies in my rationality (I should hope, at least).
While building upon the classical model’s reliance on deliberative
decision-making, the behavioral model does not recognize a second crutch
for decision-making: behavioral rules. This route of decision-making is
labeled the “heuristic route.” According to Bicchieri, to prime a behavioral
rule that applies to a particular situation, an individual categorizes relevant
actions into various contexts based on memory. As such, cognitive shortcuts
allow individuals to activate appropriate scripts and schemata for any given
situation. For instance, I have a memory of luminaria lighting that is cued
by the context of Christmas in New Mexico. My mind automatically begins
calculating the percent tip owed upon receiving my dinner bill. Bicchieri
explains:
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[Heuristic route] behavior is guided by default rules stored in memory
that are cued by contextual stimuli…According to the heuristic route,
norm compliance is an automatic response to situational cues that focus
our attention on a particular norm, rather than a conscious decision to give
priority to normative consideration (5)

This heuristic form of decision-making is distinct from the heuristics described
by the behavioral model, since it suggests society provides additional cues
for automated responses. By “cuing” the behavioral rule, society prescribes
a particular course of action for a given situation. The subsequent action can
be categorized as either of the two forms of non-choice.
The first version of non-choice occurs when decisions are made
without thought and according to automatic procedures.
Previous
constructions of social norms integrate rational decision-making into the
decision to comply to the norm, by imposing an incentive structure with
sanctions or rewards for compliance (Cialdini 1990). In this way, conformity
was a conscious process that included a cost-benefit analysis for conforming or
transgressing. Yet, in Bicchieri’s rational reconstruction, these rigorous costbenefit analyses are unnecessary to induce conformity, since “compliance is
often automatic and unreflective” (4). Bicchieri emphasizes the automatic
component of norm compliance over the deliberative side of conformity:
The rational reconstruction of social norms does not commit us to avow that
we always engage in conscious deliberation to decide whether to folow a
norm. We may follow a norm automatically and thoughtlessly and yet still
be able to explain our action in terms of beliefs and desires (3).

I set out the luminarias each winter or tip 20% without thought: I do not
reflect upon the costs and benefits of my behavior, nor do I think about the
principles and moral precepts underlying my actions; rather, I conform
according to routine. I conform because of my expectations that the tradition
will continue each year in my neighborhood, without fanfare or deliberation.
Bicchieri notes, “Once one adopts a behavioral rule, one follows it without
the conscious and systematic assessment of the situation performed in
deliberation” (4). Thus, these behavioral rules are substituted for individual
thought, making them a form of non-choice.
This form of non-choice is distinct from the behavioral model’s
reliance on psychological heuristics and automated habits. In these nonchoices, I am not going on “autopilot” since I am still consciously aware of my
actions. This distinction from non-choice without thought and automated
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processes is critical because it does not make my behavior irrational.
Bicchieri writes, “There is a difference, though, between choosing rationally
and choosing a course of action because it is the rational thing to do…Lack of
awareness should not be equated with lack of rationality” (Bicchieri 47-50).
Using Bicchieri’s example, a stock trader that uses a conventional signaling
system is making a rational decision because she wants to buy and sell shares
and the system is a way to coordinate with other traders. However, perhaps
the trader was never aware or thought about the signaling convention as a
coordinating device. She did not choose the device for rational reasons, but
nonetheless made a rational decision to comply. The latter circumstance, in
which the trader acted without thinking, is a rational non-choice. Bicchieri
elaborates:
This, I must add, is a common experience; frequently we do not think much
before acting, in the sense that our behavior does not consciously follow
from intentions or plans and is carried out without awareness or attention.
To engage in a thoughtful process, we must be sufficiently motivated:
The situation must have high personal relevance, our action must have
important consequences, we are held responsible for our choice, or there is
some challenge present. As opposed to this thoughtful evaluation of pros
and cons, we usually engage in a more rapid, heuristic form of processing
(47).

This passage perfectly describes the parallel between heuristic decisionmaking through reliance on social norms and the lack of thought in a nonchoice. Thus, social norms comprise the first type of non-choice—lacking
thought and intentions derived from a free and rational cognitive process.
Decision-making that relies upon behavioral rules in social norms
also fits into the second form of non-choice, which occurs when there is a
misalignment of thought, will, and action. Bicchieri acknowledges that the
distinction between deliberative and heuristic routes to behavior is a useful
simplification, but is often not as clear-cut in reality. Rather, individuals may
conform to a norm not through automatic processes, but for fear of negative
social consequences (Bicchieri 51). In other words, an individual may
rigorously deliberate with himself over his decision to follow a behavioral
rule and may determine that following the rule is counter-preferential, but
nonetheless follow it for fear of sanction for violating the norm (Bicchieri
51). The social norms direct the will toward exogenous preferences rather
than endogenously defined preferences. Any decision based on expectations
of others is exogenous to individual, or endogenous, preferences. In other
words, if a preference is conditional on others’ behavior, it cannot be aligned
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with self-defined preferences. For instance, the individual may determine
through thought that his preference is not to tip 20% at a restaurant he will
never visit again. Yet, his individual preference becomes conditional on
others’ compliance to the social norm, an exogenous preference. The social
norm, therefore, directs his will toward the exogenous goal of complying
with the social norm. He acts counter-preferentially not by a lack of thought,
but by allowing the norm to impose conditional preferences. Thus, any
counter-preferential decision is a non-choice.
In this way, social norms constitute non-choices either through a
lack of thought or the misdirection of will. Under the new conception, social
norms are the aggregation of individual non-choices. People are not acting,
but behaving. People are not choosing, but conforming. This collective
banal behavior has both positive and negative consequences. Reviewing
the banality of non-choices reveals how social norms can produce negative
externalities without evil motives—Arendt’s concept of the banality of evil
applied to collective behavior. A less frequently analyzed topic is the effect
of collective non-choices on good externalities. Pro-social behavior may be
promoted through mundane motivations to conform to a social norm. In
these cases, people are not motivated by altruism or generosity, but simply
by the desire to conform. The banality of goodness is a no less terrifying
concept, as human dignity and kindness may be nothing but an illusion,
caught behind the veil of collective non-choices.
The Banality of Evil Behavior
Locating the psychological source of horrific human action, especially
the Nazi death camps in World War II, has become as rich an intellectual
endeavor as understanding human choice and freedom. As Richard J.
Bernstein writes in his philosophical interrogation of Racial Evil, the visibility
of evil in the modern era, from Auschwitz to Cambodia and from Rwanda
to Bosnia, has created a paradox for understanding these atrocities. On one
hand, the visibility of evil has reached a peak in the twentieth and twenty
first centuries—through reports on genocides, famine, and death camps,
yet the intellectual resources for understanding evil are limited. Studying
the topic “numbs us” through the excruciating descriptions and personal
testimonies of events. The question stemming from each horrific event is not
only how humans have committed such horrific crimes against humanity,
but also “what do we really mean when we describe an act, an event, or a
person as evil?” (Bernstein 1-2).
Despite the numbing effect, this question is not devoid of answers.
Kant coined the term “radical evil” to explain such horrors. While controversy
surrounds what this term means, it is clear that Kant believes an individual’s
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will, rather than his reason, is the source of evil. Importantly, Kant does not
allege that humans are naturally inclined to commit evil acts; rather, humans
can choose to commit evil. Their volitions direct their evil actions, making
the individual fully responsible for his evil maxim (Bernstein 15 and 43).
The location of evil in the will attributes an evil motive or intention to the
actor. In short, it attributes evil to a choice. Bernstein writes, “Kant never
compromises on the principle that it is always within our power to choose
between good and evil maxims, and that it is we (and we alone) who must
bear the responsibility for these choices” (43).
Kant’s conception of radical evil is fundamentally flawed for two
reasons. First, it presumes a level of consciousness in actions, which may
not be present. In the presence of automated, norm-based decisions, the
individual is unaware of his motives to act. Thus, under Kant’s conception
of evil, non-choice does not exist, since only people who are fully conscious
of their motives can act. This has proven to be theoretically false and will
soon be proven descriptively invalid. Moreover, in this world, the diffusion
of responsibility would reduce to an environment in which no agent is
responsible for his actions or crimes, since a motive may never be directly
pin-pointed.
A second flaw of Kant’s conception of evil is that it allows human
atrocities to be rationalized. Arendt writes in The Origins of Totalitarianism
that Kant rationalized the concept of racial evil as “perverted ill will” that
could be explained by “comprehensible motives.” For her, comprehending
the incomprehensible left no rational solution to evil (Bernstein 11).
This paradox of never being able to understand the incomprehensible
led Arendt to her own conception of evil. She proposed that evil outcomes
might not always be attributed to an evil motive, but may possibly occur
through a lack of thought—a non-choice under the current framework.
Arendt’s report on the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem coined a
controversial phrase: the banality of evil. Arendt attributed Eichmann’s evil
actions not to a psychological evil motive or a predisposition to wickedness,
but to a lack of thought. She writes:
However monstrous the deeds were, the doer was neither monstrous nor
demonic, and the only specific characteristic one could detect in his past as
well as in his behavior during the trial and the preceding policy examination
was something entirely negative: it was not stupidity but a curious, quite
inauthentic inability to think (Responsibility and Judgment 159).

Eichmann’s thoughtlessness renders his actions non-choices. He lacked
an evil motive in the Kantian sense; rather, his motives were compliance
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to a set of bureaucratic rules. While this study concerns non-choices in the
collective, Eichmann illustrates the horrific consequences of one individual’s
non-choice. Like Eichmann, those non-choosers in the collective also exhibit
a lack of thought and judgment over the codes they follow.
Eichmann’s inability to think manifested itself in his testimony
in court through a reliance on clichés and his flagrant contradictions and
inconsistencies—a fact that had not bothered him at trial, according to
Arendt. She writes:
Clichés, stock phrases, adherence to conventional, standardized codes of
expression and conduct have the socially recognized function of protecting
us against reality, that is, against the claim on our thinking attention which
all events and facts arouse by virtue of their existence (Responsibility and
Judgment 160).

His reliance on standardized codes of expression and conduct parallels an
individual’s reliance on psychological heuristics and social norms to guide
behavior. Individuals’ use of conventions to direct their actions protects
them from the reality of their actions. Thus, collective banal behavior that
causes negative externalities does not bother an individual non-chooser,
since “everyone else does it.” Following a social norm offers protection
from the moral realities of the actions, just as Eichmann’s insistence to follow
orders severed him from judging the morality of his behavior.
Most importantly, Eichmann “had not the slightest difficulty in
accepting an entirely different set of rules” (Arendt, Responsibility and
Judgment 159). As we shall see, those following anti-social or unpopular
norms are almost instantly convinced to comply with a completely
different set of rules. This quick reversal of behavior mirrors Eichmann’s
instantaneous reversal in judgment of his actions: “He knew that what he
had once considered his duty was now called a crime, and he accepted this
new code of judgment as though it were nothing but another language
rule” (Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment 159). This rapid reversal of
preferences, both on the individual and collective levels, provides evidence
for the lack of thought in bad outcomes, as “evil” actions are not rooted in
anything endogenously substantive.
FGM/C

The first descriptive account of banal behavior with negative
externalities is female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C). Before defining
the practice as a collection of individual non-choices, or a social norm, it is
helpful to understand the practice itself, its prevalence, and its purposes. From
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the start, it is essential to note that the decision to cut or not to cut is made by
someone other than the female. If the girl is young enough, a surrogate may
make the decision on her behalf or impose the decision upon her without
her consent. Because the surgery is irreversible, the girl never has the ability
to properly choose whether to be cut or not, even upon reaching adulthood.
This imposition of the decision complicates but does not prohibit studying
the practice under the lens of choice and non-choice. When describing the
preferences and decisions to undergo the practice, this account will refer to
the preferences and decisions of whoever makes the decision on the girl’s
behalf—an imperfect but necessary solution to the complication.
FGM/C describes the practice of partially or totally removing the
external female genitalia. The practice ranges from removal of the clitoris to
removal of all external genitalia, leaving only a small opening for urine and
menstrual blood (“Fact Sheet”). The practice is most common in 28 countries
in Africa and the Middle East, but also occurs at high rates in Indonesia,
Malaysia, Pakistan, and India. Tremendous challenges exist in trying to
identify how many women and girls undergo the practice, since reporting
may be inaccurate, especially where the practice is illegal or socially
unacceptable, and since it is difficult to validate the accuracy of reporting.
However, some estimate that three million women and girls undergo FGM/C
annually (Population Council, “Change is Possible”).
It is imperative to note that the reason this practice comes under the
label of banal behavior with negative externalities is not due to individual
reasons or cultural traditions for the practice. The categorization is not
meant to insult a particular way of life or liken it to the atrocities previously
discussed. Rather, it is placed under the negative label due to the host of
health problems associated with the practice. The problems depend upon
the degree of cutting, the sanitation of the tools, and the girls’ health. The
short-term health problems include bleeding or hemorrhaging, infection,
pain, and trauma. Long-term health problems include problems going
to the restroom which may cause infection, vaginal scarring that makes
sexual intercourse painful, painful menstruation, increased risk of sexually
transmitted infections, fertility problems, problems during child birth, and
psychological and emotional stress including post-traumatic stress disorder
and depression (“Fact Sheet”). Reading the list of health problems sickens in
the same way that Bernstein suggests excruciating and detailed descriptions
of evil events can make us “numb” (1).
Despite its numbing effect, the prevalence of the practice, along with
the tremendous health consequences, has led major organizations—including
the United Nations, World Health Organization, and Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs)—to study the motives underlying the practice for the
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purpose of creating strategy interventions to end the practice. Contrary to
common belief, FGM/C is not condoned in any religious text and not directly
undertaken for religious purposes, although they are sometimes used as a
guise. Rather, it is practiced for social, economic and political reasons. The
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of Women’s Health
explains the many possible individual motives for the practice:
Those who support FGC believe that it will empower their daughters,
ensure the girls get married, and protect the family’s good name. In some
groups, FGC is performed to show a girl’s growth into womanhood and,
as in the Masai community, marks the start of a girl’s sexual debut. It also
is performed to keep a woman’s virginity by limiting her sexualbehavior.
FGC is believed (by those who practice it) to stop a woman’s sexual desire.
In some groups, women who are not cut are viewed as dirty and are treated
badly. While FGC pre-dates both Christianity and Islam, religion is also
used to promote the practice. Some communities believe that in order to be
good Muslims, parents must have their daughters cut. There are also many
superstitions about FGC, such as: The clitoris will continue to grow as a girl
gets older and so it must be removed; [and] the external genitalia are unclean
and can actually cause the death of an infant during delivery (“Fact Sheet”).

This list of motives—superstitious, religious beliefs, and notions of
sexuality—could be integrated into an active choice model if they are genuine,
endogenously defined preferences. Because discerning whether these
preferences were created under a rigorous thought process is impossible, we
cannot definitively conclude that they are genuine choices. However, it is
theoretically possible that individuals actively choose to cut their daughters
with the alignment of thought/will/action. If they are indeed acting upon
their own preferences, intervention becomes unnecessarily corrosive on the
individual’s freedom and rationality. After all, we can’t argue with others’
preferences.
There is one other motive attributed to the practice that offers an
opportunity for intervention for those wishing to end the widespread
practice. The Office of Women’s Health explains, “FGC is often part of a
community’s tradition. Most parents who support FGC believe they are
protecting their daughter’s future marriage prospects, and not hurting her. It
is seen by parents as part of a girl’s upbringing” (“Fact Sheet”). Undertaking
a practice for tradition and for social purposes signals that people who cut
their daughters may not be actively choosing based on their endogenously
defined preferences. Rather, individuals may be deciding to cut their
daughters for the exogenous purposes of conforming to tradition, inducing
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them to undertake a counter-preferential action. They are engaging in nonchoice through the misalignment of their preferences and actions. Similarly,
if they decide to cut their daughters without thought to their preferences for
cutting, they are non-choosing.
Understanding the social motive for conformity is essential for
intervention strategists. Strategists who address religious motives will
necessarily fail, because, in addition to being corrosive of the individual’s
free will, they address the wrong trigger of action. Strategists who create
strategies to address the decisions to comply to an unpopular norm must
address the social motives that prompt the counter-preferential action. As
one NGO working on intervention strategies for FGM/C notes, “FGM/C is
practiced for a variety of reasons differing by ethnic groups even within the
same country. It is essential, therefore, to tailor any intervention to address
community rationale for FGM/C and take into account readiness to openly
question and address the issue” (Population Council, “Change is Possible”).
For this reason, the Population Council believes that the “most effective
approaches for abandonment of FGM/C are multifaceted, intervening at
many strategic points and promoting a different norm publicly” (“Change
is Possible”). Strategies include education of the physical and psychological
effects of the practice, public debate about the practice, and public pledge of
abandonment. This multi-faceted approach focuses on the social motivations
for cutting and the interdependent decisions of members of the community.
In short, it considered FGM/C to be a social norm.
Defining FGM/C as a social norm is now widely accepted among
international organizations, including the United Nation’s Children’s Fund
(UNICEF) and major NGO’s, such as Tostan. In addressing the problem
of FGM/C, UNICEF focuses on the social dynamics of the practice and the
importance of interdependent decision-making. The intervention strategies
address social norms, as defined in game-theoretic terms. Importantly, the
practice perfectly fits Bicchieri’s definition of social norms, and thereby
establishes itself as a collection of individual non-choices.
The first indication that FGM/C is a social norm is the clustering
of its practice. If a sufficient subset of the population is required for
conformity, then a clustering of conformity would be expected. If the
practice is undertaken for individual, endogenously defined preferences,
then the rate of conformity should be evenly distributed across a population.
The practice is not evenly distributed and its prevalence varies drastically
by country—1% in Cameroon and 5% in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo practice FGM/C compared to 96% in Egypt and Guinea and 90% in
Somalia (Lewnes 4-5). Thus, the clustering subsets of the population who
undertake the practice signify that it has community-based motives rather
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than individually defined motives. In addition, the practice is contingent
upon the family preferring marriage to non-marriage and understanding
that the behavioral rule to cut applies to the marriage situation.
Most importantly, the practice is a conditional preference based on
both empirical and normative expectations. UNICEF relates the practices
to a conditional preference by focusing on the community motive, thereby
considering it a social norm (they refer to norm as a social convention, but
the effect is the same) (Lewnes 2005). UNICEF reports:
The social processes of FGM/C resemble the social dynamics of the selfenforcing social convention theory identified by Schelling. Families carry
out FGM/C to ensure the marriageability and status of their daughters
within the intramarrying group. For marriage and for status, what one
family chooses to do depends on what other families in that community
choose to do (Lewnes 13).

The motive of marriageability and social status are conditional preferences
because they are goals that are dependent upon the community at large.
They are conditioned upon the empirical expectation that other members
of the community cut their daughters and the normative expectation that
they are expected to cut their daughter. It may also be the case that they are
based on the normative expectation with sanctions since “no one family can
abandon the practice on its own; to do so would ruin the marriageability and
status of that family’s daughters” (Lewnes 13). Thus, if a family does not
cut their daughter, they are faced with the social sanction of lowered social
status and potential financial ruin by not marrying off their daughter.
Because the preferences are conditioned upon the perceptions of
eligibility for marriage and the relative status of others, they are exogenously
defined motives, thereby constituting them as non-choices. This indicates
FGM/C is the second type of non-choice—the misalignment of the choice
process—rather than a type of thought. Individuals who are engaging in the
practice are still rational, but are acting counter-preferentially. The counterpreferential nature of the decision to cut is empirically proven. In Burkina
Faso, for instance, 72.5% of women undergo FGM/C. Yet, when they were
interviewed, only 11.1% of women between 15 to 29 years old preferred to
support the practice (Mackie “Presentation Philosophy of Social Science”).
The women endogenously preferred not to cut their daughters, yet acted
counter-preferentially. They engaged in non-choice through a misalignment
of the thought, will, and action.
Unraveling why individuals engage in counter-preferential decisions
leads back to the game-theoretic construction of social norms as transforming
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a mixed-motive game into a coordination game. In a mixed-motive game, the
payoffs for cutting are less than not cutting, as the preferences elicited in the
Burkina Faso study suggest. The preferences without a norm in place create
the following game matrix, played with the self and “others” representing
the entire community:
Game 3: Mixed-Motive
Others
Uncut
Cut
			
		
Self
		

Uncut

5,5

5, 0

Cut

0, 5

0,0

This table illustrates a mixed-motive game that has a dominant strategy to
not cut, since the payoff in “Don’t Cut” strategy always outweighs the “Cut”
strategy. In this individual mixed-motive game, the Nash Equilibrium is
everyone not deciding to cut his or her daughters.
However, the game theory matrix with the norm of cutting in place
transforms the game into a coordination game. The following matrix uses
the same payoffs in UNICEF’s report:
Game 4: Coordination
		
Others
Uncut
Cut

			

		
		Self
		

Uncut

3,3

0, 2

Cut

2, 0

1, 1

In this game, the presence of the norm transforms the payoffs to create a
coordination game. Importantly, there are two stable Nash Equilibria: both
cut, or both don’t cut (Lewnes 15). Either coordination strategy constitutes
an equilibrium, because no one can make himself or herself better off by
changing strategies. They have no incentive to deviate from their chosen
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course of action; therefore their strategies are mutual best responses to the
others’ actions.
Significantly, the presence of both stable coordination strategies
gives those wishing to end the practice hope. The equilibrium of both cutting
is referred to as “stuck in the tragic equilibrium.” UNICEF reports:
The members of a FGM/C-practicing community find themselves in the
tragic equilibrium portrayed in the lower-right box D: Self Cut and Other Cut
– All Cut. Individually, each would be better off in the hopeful equilibrium
portrayed…All Uncut. Each values the tragic equilibrium of All Cut at 1,
each values the hopeful equilibrium of All Uncut at 3, but no individual
acting alone can make the move from the worse equilibrium, All Cut, to the
better equilibrium, All Uncut. To do so on her own would make her worse
off (Lewnes 16).

The strategy to play the sub-optimal equilibrium is not irrational, either,
because it integrates the benefits of conforming and the sanctions of noncompliance into the decision matrix. UNICEF reports that even if each
individual endogenously prefers to escape the equilibrium:
The tragic equilibrium of All Cut traps everyone. Because of the
interdependency of choice, even if every single individual in the community
wanted to abandon the practice, no individual could do so on her own.
Why? Abandonment of cutting would make an individual worse off, unless
she can be sure that everyone else would stop as well. The fact that Other
may want to stop provides Self no assurance that Other actually has stopped,
or will stop. And from Other’s point of view, the fact that Self hopes to or
might stop provides no assurance either (Lewnes 16).

Coordinating the collective abandonment of the practice must address
these social motivates, rather than individual motives. Legal strategies
are insufficient for compliance, as the Population Council notes, “Passage
of laws to criminalize the practice are not sufficient because they do not
address underlying social norms supporting FGM/C” (“Change is Possible”).
Incorporating two other concepts of game theory alongside the theory
of social norms bolsters intervention strategies: pluralistic ignorance and
tipping points.
First, pluralistic ignorance addresses that fact that people are
unaware of others’ non-choices. Pluralistic ignorance is a cognitive state in
which one believes one’s preferences are different from those of similarlysituated individuals, even if one’s behavior is identical to others’ behavior
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(Bicchieri 186). The process of pluralistic ignorance occurs where no
transparent communication is possible and when people engage in social
comparison with others’ observable behavior, assume that others’ behavior
is consistent with their preferences, and infer that everyone who engages in
the same behavior endorses their own behavior (Bicchieri 186-188). Thus,
they conform to the same behavior because of a false inference of preferences.
The concept of non-choice enhances and simplifies the understanding
of pluralistic ignorance. People subscribe to the same inference of preferences
as in revealed preference theory, and thereby falsely characterize others’
behavior as choices. This reveals one major consequence of non-choice:
if you behave according to others’ actions, you may mistakenly behave
according to counter-preferential actions, thereby making your own
behavior counter-preferential. Thus, non-choices and pluralistic ignorance
may lead to the emergence and perpetuation of unpopular norms. For
instance, racial segregation may be supported by non-choices through the
process of conforming to counter-preferential actions. A study in 1975 found
that 18% of those polls actually favored segregation, but 47% believed that
most favored segregation (O’Gorman 1975; Bicchieri 193). The racist norm
undoubtedly sustained itself in American thought due to a misperception
of others’ preferences. Thus, when actors use others’ actions rather than
thought as the basis for preference-generation, a racist norm may persist.
Informational cascades are one mechanism that may support
pluralistic ignorance. This occurs when one group of trendsetters acts in one
way, which causes the others to act based on the inferred preference of those
trendsetters, which causes others to act based on those trendsetters, and so
forth. The cascade of inferences is based on others’ actions, which conveys no
truthful information about preferences. A norm set off by an informational
cascade is very fragile and easily upset by truthful information. Bicchieri
writes:
To model the effects pluralistic ignorance may have on the dynamics of
unpopular norms, we need to model how people may rapidly converge on a
common behavioral pattern on the basis of very little information, and how
even a little new information, suggesting that a different course of action is
optimal, may shift collective behavior in a direction opposite to the status
quo (Bicchieri 86).

The model Bicchieri uses to prompt this shift in behavior is an informational
cascade, which takes very little to reverse the cascade.
FGM/C is likely a case of pluralistic ignorance triggered by an
informational cascade, evidenced by the rapid rates of abandonment. In
90

SPICE | Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Undergraduate Journal

Lauren M. Harding
communities where FGM/C is prevalent, people wrongly infer that others’
actions are based on their true beliefs and there is a lack of transparent
communication. There is an informational cascade in which people base
their actions on others’ behavior, which has little to no informational value
about genuine preferences. Intervention strategies that successfully shift
the norm toward abandonment reveal that pluralistic ignorance is at play.
Specifically, one of the six elements in the UNICEF strategy for abandonment
is an explicit, public affirmation in communities of their genuine preferences.
Individuals in a community must publically commit to abandon the practice
in a large public gathering or through a widely distributed statement.
Once the genuine preferences are made public, the norm based on
false inferences of preferences (i.e. based on others’ non-choices) quickly
shatters. It is so fragile that approval of the practice shifts almost overnight,
finally converging on the equilibrium reflective of genuine preferences.
This is empirically supported by the success of such public abandonment
strategies in communities. In one community in Senegal, Tostan measured
the approval ratings for FGM/C before and after the intervention strategy:
FGM/C Preferences and Practices
Changes in approval ratings for FGC following implementation of the Tostan
community education program, Senegal
Participants
Baseline

Endline

Comparison Group
Baseline

Endline

Women
Approve FGC

72%

16%

89%

60%

Will cut daughters in the future

71%

12%

89%

54%

66%

13%

78%

56%

---

20%

---

63%

Men
Will cut daughters in the future
Prefers a woman who has been cut

Clearly, the data indicates a rapid reversal of willingness to cut after the
public pledge of abandonment—from 72% to 16% for women and from 66%
to 3% for men (Population Council, “Change is Possible”).
The second useful concept for understanding the quick abandonment
and fragility of unpopular social norms is Thomas Schelling’s concept of a
“tipping point” of behavior. Gerry Mackie likens the coordination game
and tipping point to sitting in a standing audience. Perhaps everyone in
the audience prefers to sit to watch a performance. If one person prefers
to sit and acts upon that preference, then she doesn’t see the performance.
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Everyone else in the audience will remain standing unless a certain threshold
of people decides to sit. Similarly, “if only one family abandons FGC, its
daughter doesn’t get married” (Lewnes 17). Thus, a critical mass of sitting
or abandoning FGM/C is necessary to tip to the preferred equilibrium. Once
enough people decide to act upon their genuine preferences, they have an
incentive to declare their intentions and recruit others to adopt their new
practice. If a sufficient number of people desire to abandon the practice of
cutting their daughters, then the social norm may tip to the other stable Nash
Equilibrium of everyone choosing not to cut. The tipping point does not
transform the coordination game back into a mixed-motive game, but tips it
to the mutually preferable equilibrium. Thus, individuals are finally able to
align their preferences, will, and actions; they are able to choose.
Nowhere in this description of the widespread practice of FGM/C
is an account of “evil motives.” Describing social norms as a collection of
individual non-choices not only preserves the rationality of the individuals
partaking in counter-preferential decisions, but it also preserves their
humanity. Analyzing an “irrational” decision or “evil” crime must take into
account the presence of social norms in order to accurately qualify them as
“evil.” Perhaps their motivation is not demonic, but social. Perhaps they
are not choosing an evil course of action, but non-choosing a conforming
behavior.
Rather than attributing motives to the negative externalities, the case
of FGM/C illustrates banal behavior through the aggregation of counterpreferential non-choices. It was not the case that individuals did not think
about their preferences for cutting. Their thought is evidenced in the study
in Burkina Faso in which women declared their genuine preference. The
presence of the norm to cut did not change individual preferences for
cutting, but directed the will toward an action misaligned with thought—a
non-choice.
Foot-binding
Social norms also facilitate banal behavior resulting from the
collection of decisions made without thought. Non-choice without thought
also preserves individual rationality, since individuals are not incapable of
rational choice, but are simply not utilizing their capacity for reason. Like
the case of counter-preferential non-choices, social norms that produce bad
externalities are not caused by individual evil motives. Arendt describes
social norms as one danger perpetuated by non-thinking. She says that nonthinking teaches the individuals to substitute social norms for thought:
[Non-thinking] teaches them [individuals] to hold fast to whatever the
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prescribed rules of conduct may be at a given time in a given society.
What people then get used to is not so much the content of the rules, a
close examination of which would always lead them into perplexity, as the
possession of rules under which to subsume particulars. In other words,
they get used to never making up their minds (Arendt, Responsibility and
Judgment 178).

Instead of thought preparing the path for action, social norms prescribe
a person’s conduct. People do not act, but behave in accordance with the
cultural norms they are given.
The social norm of foot-binding in China illustrates the case of
banal behavior perpetuated by the absence of thought, rather than by
evil or irrational motives. Understanding the practice, its purposes, and
its prevalence is again necessary to understand its categorization as a
social norm. Foot-binding is a practice that consists of wrapping a six- to
eight-year-old girl’s toes under the foot and the sole toward the heel. The
wrapping bandage is worn day and night in an attempt to achieve a pointed
four-inch-long foot (Mackie 1000). As in the case of FGM/C, foot-binding is
included under the heading of negative externalities not for cultural reasons,
but due to its tremendous health risks: “Complications included ulceration,
paralysis, gangrene, and mortification of the lower limbs; perhaps 10 percent
of girls did not survive the treatment.” Due to these health risks, and the
extreme pain of the practice, the saying became, “A mother can’t love both
her daughter and her daughter’s feet at the same time” (Mackie 1000). In
addition to the physical pain, the women with bound feet were left crippled
and housebound. This made costs of the practice extremely high, since a
working-class family had to choose between binding their daughter’s feet
and using her for labor in the fields. The opportunity cost of lost wages, then,
must be included in the list of negative externalities.
The prevalence of the practice was also extremely high. It originated
in the Sung Dynasty (960-1279), perhaps by a dancer in the emperor’s
palace or the love poet Li Yu (937-978), and subsequently spread rapidly.
At first it was fashionable to bind a woman’s foot, but foot-binding quickly
transformed into a social requirement in which “people were ashamed not
to practice it” (Mackie 1001). By the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), the practice
was a deeply ingrained norm. Over time, it spread from the upper classes to
the lower classes and became more exaggerated. By 1835, 50 to 80 percent
of women bound their feet—the clear exceptions being working women and
women in the lowest rungs of society. The practice’s evolution may be seen
as the evolution of a choice to follow a fashion to a non-choice reinforced by
social norms.
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UNICEF says that there are important parallels between FGM/C and
foot-binding in China. Mackie describes the similarities between the two
practices:
Among the correspondences between foot-binding and FGM/C, they both:
• Are nearly universal customs within groups where they are practiced;
they are persistent and are practiced even by people who oppose them.
• Control sexual access to females and promote female chastity and fidelity,
at least in their origins.
• Are considered to be necessary for proper marriage and are believed to be
sanctioned by tradition.
• Seem to have a past of contagious diffusion and are supported and
transmitted by women (UNICEF 3; Mackie 999).

Most significantly, foot-binding resembles FGM/C insofar as it is a selfenforcing convention, perpetuated by the informal social punishment of
chastisement in the marriage market for non-compliance (Mackie 999).
Intervening to end the practice originally failed. In 1665, the Manchu
conquerors failed to abolish the practice by imposing steep legal penalties.
An edict against foot-binding failed again in 1847. As in the case of FGM/C,
these strategies failed because they neglected to address the social nature of
the practice. If the motive is social, any intervention targeting the individual
utility function will necessarily fail. Progress towards abandonment only
began at the point when anti-foot-binding societies emerged. Protestant
missionaries founded the first society in 1874 and the first indigenous society
began in 1897. By 1912, the Nationalist Revolution banned the practice
(Mackie 1001). Because the societies recognized the social conditioning of
the practice, they had hope for success.
Reformers used three key strategies to end the practice of footbinding in China: reformers educated the Chinese that the country was
“losing face” in the international arena, in which other countries did not
practice foot-binding; they educated the Chinese on the health problems
of bound feet; and they created social networks of “natural foot societies.”
The final element resembles the strategy of public pledge of abandonment
in FGM/C, as it created an informal social sanction by having individuals
publically pledge not to allow sons to marry women with bound feet and not
to allow daughters to bind their feet (Lewnes 3).
The social strategy ended the practice almost immediately. In
fact, the practice of foot-binding lasted for over 1,000 years, but ended in
a single generation (Mackie 999). In one rural area, the female population
went from 99% bound in 1889 to 0% bound in 1919 (Mackie 1001). This
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instantaneous reversal can also be diagrammed in game-theoretic terms, as
the Nash Equilibrium changed from the “tragic equilibrium” to the preferable
equilibrium by transforming the norm from a strategy of compliance to
coordinated repudiation of the practice.
The stability of the tragic equilibrium may have been partially
perpetuated by counter-preferential non-choices, since “some Chinese
opposed foot-binding as useless but felt obliged to conform for the sake
of proper marriage” (Mackie 1001). However, these counter-preferential
decisions seem to be the minority of cases. The more likely case is that the
norm was perpetuated by non-choices characterized by a lack of thought.
This proposition is supported by the other explanations of foot-binding.
Some explanatory theories suggest that the Chinese people developed an
aesthetic appreciation for small feet (Levy 1966), believed the practice
displayed a family’s wealth (Veblen 1934), and distinguished the Chinese
from other northern ethnicities (Ebrey 1990). This indicates that people
desired to bind their daughters’ feet. With a few exceptions, the practice was
not against rational self-interest, but aligned with genuine preferences.
Despite the alignment of the will and action, the almost instantaneous
reversal of a social norm suggests that the element of non-thinking played a
prominent role in foot-binding. For non-thinkers, adopting a new rule of
conduct is easy (given that the majority of others also conform to the new
rule) because they are not choosing their course of action, but allowing their
behavior to be chosen for them. In China, women were not choosing to bind
their feet. They simply bound their feet because society told them to bind
their feet. They did not think about their own preferences. Arendt comments
on the quick reversal of behavior for non-thinkers:
If somebody then should show up who, for whatever reasons and
purposes wishes to abolish the old ‘values’ or virtues, he will find it easy
enough provided he offers a new code, and he will need no force and no
persuasion—no proof that the new values are better than the old ones—to
establish it. The faster men held to the old code, the more eager will they be
to assimilate themselves to the new one; the ease with which such reversals
can take place under certain circumstances suggests indeed that everybody
is asleep when they occur (Responsibility and Judgment 178).

Thus, whenever a rapid reversal of behavior occurs, an element of nonthinking is likely at play since individuals are not choosing according to their
own self-written law, but allowing society to dictate their behavior.
This point of the rapid reversal of norms, perpetuated by nonthinking non-choices, is illustrated most simply by Sweden’s “Dagan H” dag
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for road reversal. People drive on the right side of the road because others
drive on the right side, making it in their own best interests to coordinate in
order to avoid head-on collisions. The right-side-of-the-road preference is
conditional on others’ actions. Yet, although coordinating driving behavior
is in each driver’s individual self-interest, it is not a behavior that is based on
thought. Drivers do not inherently prefer the right to the left; they simply
want to coordinate their actions and drive on.
Sweden encountered a problem in this desire to coordinate driving
strategies. In Sweden, most cars were left-hand vehicles, but the country’s
immediate neighbors, including Norway drove on the right. This discrepancy
in strategies caused many head-on collisions when passing in two-lane
highways, prompting the Swedish government to begin the HTK (Statens
Högertrafikkommission) or the “state right-hand traffic commission.”
It prepared for “Dagen H,” a day that would shift the norm from left- to
right-side driving. On Sunday, September 3, 1967, all traffic was prohibited
between 1 and 6 p.m. to convert the roads. Before 1 p.m., the norm was
left–side driving; after 6 p.m., the norm was right-side driving. The shift
was pleasantly uneventfulIn fact, 5 fewer traffic accidents were reported
on Monday morning than on the previous Mondays (125 from 130 to 198)
(“Dagen H”). The shift was quick and painless largely because the norm was
perpetuated by non-thinking. If people had genuine preferences for driving
on the left, then the new norm would have caused chaos and social upheaval.
Because people were behaving according to a thoughtless norm, it was not
difficult to assimilate to a different, thoughtless norm.
Dagen H illustrates how non-thinking non-choices can also lead to
deeply engrained social norms. While FGM/C was an example of the negative
externalities caused by a misalignment of will and thought, acting according
to given social constructs is perhaps more terrifying and dangerous. Just as
Eichmann systematically executed millions by a lack of thought, a collection
of individuals can create social phenomena through non-thinking decisions.
It does not take radically evil motives to create social phenomena with
horrific outcomes. Millions of women are circumcised annually and millions
of Chinese women were crippled not due to evil motivations, but due to nonchoices.
The insight that motives are not necessarily the driving force
behind suboptimal states of the word offers hope. Bicchieri writes, “Many
norms are not socially beneficial, and once established they are difficult
to eliminate. If we know what induces people to conform to ‘anti-social’
norms, we may have a chance to curb destructive behavior” (Bicchieri 7).
The state cannot justly interfere with individual preferences, but it may have
cause to intervene if the preferences are against the individual’s self-defined
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preferences. Thus, once China and the United Nations recognized the social
aspect of foot-binding and FGM/C, they were given the opportunities to curb
the destructive behavior.
The Banality of Altruistic Behavior
Just as horrific negative externalities may result not from evil motives,
but from individual non-choices, wondrous positive externalities may result
not from altruistic motives, but from the aggregation of individual nonchoices. Like the invisible hand correcting for mistakes in the marketplace,
the interdependency of individual decisions may inadvertently guide good
behavior in society.
Costly individual behavior that has larger benefits for society
triggers the free rider problem in Public Goods Games. In the game, each
individual has an incentive to defect from contributing to the public good,
leading to a deficient outcome, or a “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968).
It has been observed that over repeated play in the Public Goods Game, there
is decay toward the free-riding equilibrium (Isaac, Walker, and Thomas 1984;
Kim and Walker 1988). This decay to the sub-optimal equilibrium may result
from rational choices in which individuals deliberate the costs and rewards
of compliance and determine that defection is in their best interests. James
Andreoni identifies this strategy to defect, based upon deliberative thought,
as the best explanation for the decision to free ride (1988). Andreoni also notes
that there may be an element of learning in this decay, in which individuals
learn that the dominant strategy is to defect after repeated interactions. Both
the calculative and learning explanations to the free riding equilibrium fall
under the active choice model, since subjects are appearing to calculate the
costs and benefits of their decisions and to act accordingly, even if it takes
some time to learn the correct response.
The decay to the suboptimal equilibrium may also result from
non-choices. In the real world, individuals may be following a social norm
of defection causing an overall deficient result for society. For instance,
society’s growing taste for tuna has led to the tragedy of the commons in
the Bluefin tuna population worldwide. Many cite that the trendy norm
of eating sushi has led to a deficient result for society and the environment
(Revkin, “Tragedy (Tuna) of the Commons”). The decision to recycle also
illustrates this point: a person may choose to recycle by thinking about the
high costs to the environment, or a person may non-choose to recycle by
observing everyone else in society recycling.
Despite this game theoretic prediction, empirical studies also
prove that free riding is not always the dominant strategy for individuals.
For instance, subjects in a Public Goods Game often play at levels halfway
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between the free riding and Pareto efficient level (Marwell and Ames 1981).
History is littered with instances in which pro-social phenomena successfully
overcame the free-rider problem. Voting, blood and organ donation, and
even communities who recycle in large quantities without external rewards,
are all social phenomena unexplainable by traditional game-theoretic
predictions. If the individual costs outweigh the individual benefits, why do
individuals nonetheless partake in pro-social behavior? What explains this
paradoxical equilibrium?
It is tempting to attribute pro-social behavior to altruistic or
benevolent motives. This account portrays the individual as a hero when she
donates blood, for example. In fact, blood drives often give donors tee shirts
and buttons proclaiming: “I’m a Hero!” (Unitedbloodservices.org). These
individuals may truly be “heroes” if they are motivated by pure benevolence
or altruism. They are heroes if they are making an active choice by thinking
critically about their preference for donation, and directing their will toward
the act of donation. However, what if these individuals were motivated by
the tee shirt proclaiming their heroism? If these individuals donated for the
sake of appearances, then did they make the decision for its own sake (a
choice) or for the sake of appearing altruistic to others (a non-choice)?
Social scientists have offered empirical evidence that benevolence
may not always be the driving force behind pro-social behavior. Rather,
social norms seem to be the motivation to conform to a behavior that has
beneficial social consequences. For example, one much-studied example of a
pro-social norm that guides behavior is the norm of fairness. In an Ultimatum
Game experiment in the United States, the fairness norm was evident. The
Proposer gave a mean offer of 30-40% of the total amount, which may have
demonstrated a fear of rejection more than a taste for fairness. However, offers
below 20% were rejected about half the time (Camerer 2003). If Responders
were acting according to the classical model of rationality, then they ought to
have accepted any non-negative allocation. By rejecting even positive offers,
they showed a preference to punish unfair offers, reinforcing the social norm
of fairness (Bicchieri 104). Even in the Dictator Game, in which the Proposer
dictates the outcome without fear of punishment, the mean allocation is 20%
(Forsythe et al. 1994). This indicates some other-regarding preference is at
play, since the rational assumption would hypothesize that the Proposer
gives nothing (Bicchieri, 107).
Fairness is just one of a host of social preferences evidenced in
Ultimatum and Dictator Games. It is important to note that social preferences
are distinct from socially motivated actions, since social preferences concern
the content of the preference rather than the motivation. Thus social
preferences, just like other individual preferences, cannot be disputed in
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decision theories. The existence of social preferences proves that individuals
are concerned not simply with their own monetary payoffs, thereby
destroying the classical assumption of narrow self-interest. Yet, are social
preferences irrational preferences? Fehr-Schmidt created an integrated
utility function to prove that inequality aversion can be factored into an
individual’s rational decision calculus (1999). This would suggest that social
preferences, for altruism or equality for instance, could be integrated into the
classical rational model alongside monetary rewards.
Yet, this integration of social preferences is not necessary to prove
an individual’s rationality in behaving pro-socially. Rather than having
society as the content of the preference, individuals may have the preference
to conform to pro-social behavior. Social norms may motivate pro-social
behavior by substituting for the individual thought process or by misaligning
the individual preference with the decision. In the latter case, individuals are
rational to act against their individual preference in order to reestablish a
net-beneficial norm. When a Responder rejects an above-zero offer, this may
be viewed as a “punishment” for the Proposer violating a norm of fairness.
In Public Goods Games, especially, cooperators are very willing to punish
free-riders, even if it is costly for them and even if they cannot resolutely
expect future benefits from punishment (Fehr and Gachter 2000). Fehr and
Gachter note that potential free-riders can only avoid or reduce punishment
by increasing their cooperation levels (2000). If a pro-social norm of fairness
is prevalent in society, then punishing violations would be in the best interest
of the individual across repeated interactions.
This punishment is not irrational, despite the cost to the Responder,
because it reestablishes a solution to a difficult coordination problem. Under
the definition of social norms, the punishment must be informal, so fear of
a reduced monetary payoff is not informal in the proper sense. However,
Dillenberger and Sadowski have suggested that an additional punishment
to non-compliance is shame (2010). When an individual behaves selfishly
under observation, or chooses the allocation that most benefits herself, the
decision-maker feels a sense of shame. This informal sanction is critical
since it induces compliance to a pro-social behavior not through integrated
sanctions (i.e. reduced payoff), but through informal social sanctions.
Pro-social norms do not always lead to beneficial results, however. In
fact, sometimes the existence of a pro-social norm actually induces anti-social
behavior. For instance, the hunter-gatherer society of the Ik was reported to
have a strong norm of reciprocity (Turnbull 1972). If one member of the
society helped another, the receiver of help would have a strong obligation
to reciprocate the favor, even in incommensurable gifts such as going to war.
As such, members of the Ik would go to great lengths to avoid receiving
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gifts, such as repairing leaky roofs at night to avoid a neighbor’s offer to help.
They were avoiding the pro-social norm of reciprocity (Bicchieri 9). Dana et
al. empirically confirm this observation of norm avoidance, using Dictator
Games to show that people will take great lengths to avoid engaging in prosocial behavior (2004).
Thus, behaving with other-regarding preferences is not irrational.
The real question is the following: is pro-social behavior a choice? Bar Hillel
and Yaari suggest that allocations in the Dictator or Ultimatum Games
follow a thoughtful distributive mechanism. This mechanism depends
upon a reflective equilibrium (Rawls 1971) and grounded in “observed
ethical judgments” or “moral intuitions” (Bar Hillel and Yaari 1983). If the
mechanism for distribution is indeed prefaced by a reflective thought, in
which one considers the moral and ethical consequences of the decision,
it is indeed a genuine choice. For instance, if I determine that I have a
preference for equality through a solitary thought process, my decision
to allocate according to that distributive mechanism can be considered
a choice. If, however, my allocation reveals my preference for equality, it
cannot be accurately considered a choice. The inference may be based on a
counter-preferential non-choice or a non-choice guided not by thought but
by automated procedures. Thus, inferring a benevolent or altruistic motive
from a good result is fallacious.
This account of pro-social behavior suggests that at the center of any
of these pro-social norms are not necessarily individual choices, but nonchoices guided by exogenously defined preferences or a lack of thought.
With the presence of a norm of generosity, for instance, “the person who
instead follows a norm of generosity or cooperation need not have a desire
to ‘feel good’” (Bicchieri 18). This is evidenced in the empirical finding that
employees in Italy who were given a paid-day-off incentive to donate blood
donated, on average, about one extra donation annually (Lacetera and Macis
2010). If the person were donating to “feel good,” then the rate of donation
should remain constant with or without the paid-day-off incentive. Thus,
other motives must be infiltrating the “purely altruistic” motives.
Benevolent motives are defined as completely other-regarding
desires. Similarly, an altruist wants to satisfy another’s desires at whatever
cost to the self. Thus, if a person is either benevolent or altruistic, they
should not be influenced by norms, but should act according to their own
benevolent or altruistic desires. This conception denies that a person can be
both a benevolent person and norm follower (Bicchieri 18). In other words,
individuals are either guided by their own preferences to act generously, or
by society’s normative and empirical expectations for behavior, but not both.
Either they act or behave.
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Benevolence, according to Bicchieri’s account, can only be a motive
for individuals directing their actions at an inner circle of relations. In this
instance, benevolence is only defined as an active choice. She writes:
Benevolence, however, is usually directed to people with whom we habitually
interact and know well. As social distance increases, benevolence tends to
decrease. If most people were benevolent toward strangers, we would need
no pro-social norms of fairness, reciprocity, or cooperation. In particular, we
would have no need for these norms that ‘internalize’ externalities created
by behavior that imposes costs on other people. Thus it is plausible that
one is guided by benevolence (or evenaltruism) in interacting with family
and friends, but when interacting with strangers, be guided by social norms.
Moreover, whereas benevolence toward those who are close to us should be
a relatively stable disposition, generosity or cooperativeness with strangers
will vary according to our expectations (Bicchieri 18-19).

Thus, benevolence and altruism by definition are choices, since people can
hold others’ well-beings as the object of their action, but cannot be motivated
by these preferences on a societal level. In other words, choices may be
founded upon preferences that have society as the object, while non-choices
have conditional preferences for conforming to a pro-social norm.
This recognition of the difference between a benevolent social
preference and an action motivated by a preference to conform to the prosocial norm is critical for policymakers or philanthropists who desire to induce
pro-social behavior. Just as interventions that targeted “evil motives” failed
in the cases of FGM/C and foot-binding, interventions that target “altruistic
motives” will necessarily fail to induce pro-social behavior if conformity is
the true preference.
Identifying the positive externalities guided by non-choices rather
than individual altruistic motives is as appealing, if not more appealing, to
policymakers and philanthropists wishing to induce pro-social behavior.
Bicchieri writes, “The idea that social norms may be cued, and hence
manipulated, is attractive. It suggests that we may be able to induce prosocial behavior and maintain social order at low costs” (7). Voting and default
organ donation serve as the two examples of individual non-choices leading
to positive benefits for society. Both cases are caused not by individual
goodness, but by a banality of goodness induced by conformity rather than thought.
Voting

Voting is necessary for democratic functioning to express “the will
of the people,” to prevent a tyranny of the majority (Pressman 2004), and
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to garner legitimacy to a government domestically and abroad (Levine
2005). Some even contend that voting allows a citizen to move the political
apparatus toward his or her preferences (Levine 2005). For these reasons,
classifying voting as a “pro-social” activity is hardly disputed.
Yet, the social phenomenon of voting presents a paradox. From the
canonical model of rational self-interest, each individual has an incentive
to free-ride on the public goods game of voting, avoiding the many costs
of showing up to the polls, while still acquiring the benefits of living in a
democratic society. However, this public choice theory of voting does not
manifest itself in reality, since people vote at much higher rates around the
world than public choice theory predicts. For instance, in 2000, 104 U.S.
million citizens voted, which represents over 50 percent of the voting eligible
population. Again in 2008, 61.6% of the voting eligible population got out
the vote (United States Election Project). In contrast, the canonical model
predicts a zero-turnout equilibrium. Many explanations which attempt to
explain this paradox between observation and prediction have surfaced.
These explanations serve not only an academic purpose, but also a practical
function, since mechanisms designed to increase turnout will necessarily fail
if they are targeting the wrong motives for voting.
The first explanations for the voting paradox conceive of voting as
an active choice. For instance, Harsanyi (1980) suggests that people turn
out on Election Day according to a utilitarian rule, or by adopting Kant’s
categorical imperative and applying it to election. In this view, individuals
ask themselves what would happen if no one voted, and thereby adopt the
action that maximizes the social welfare if it was adopted by all members of
society (Amaro De Matos and Barros 240). If individuals did vote according
to a rigorous thought process and directed their actions according to a selfdefined preference, it would be a choice.
Game theory presents another explanation of the voting paradox,
which also renders the act of voting a choice. In this perspective, citizens
vote if and only if the potential benefit of voting exceeds the costs (Palfrey
and Rosenthal 8). In the deliberative thought process, citizens should make
these calculations:
Vote if Probability (Benefit) > Cost
Abstain if Probability (Benefit) < Cost
The expected gains from voting depend on the benefit—typically the benefit
of the voter’s preferred candidate winning the election—multiplied by the
probability of the voter’s ballot determining the election. This expected
gain must outweigh the costs in order to induce voting (Pressman 5). If the
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thought process did, in fact, follow this calculus, the action of voting would
be considered a choice.
Unfortunately, manipulating any one of these variables proves to
be insufficient to explain the voting paradox under rational choice theory.
First, public choice theory attempts to explain the paradox by focusing on
the decisiveness of a vote or the expected probability of making a tangible
difference in the election’s results. While effective in small elections,
instrumentality fails to explain the paradox in large jurisdictions, such as the
United States’ presidential election. For this reason, John Aldrich suggests
that the “rationality of voting is the Achilles’ heel of rational choice theory in
political science” (Aldrich 1997).
Others focus on the costs in the decision equation to explain the
paradoxical observation. The U.S. Census Bureau found in one study that
the majority (40.6 percent) of registered voters chose to abstain in the 2002
election due to the high costs of voting (Levine 185). Unfortunately, any
calculation of costs—including tangible costs such as transportation as
well as opportunity costs such as missing work or leisure—indicate that
any rational, self-interested person should not vote. To further complicate
the rational choice perspective, significantly reducing the costs of voting
does not increase the voting rate. Patricia Funk found that introducing the
system of optional postal voting in Switzerland decreased the costs of voting
significantly, but hardly increased turnout (3 percentage points), which
Funk found to be statistically insignificant. Tilman Börgers also warns that
reducing the costs of voting through the internet may result in reduced
participation because the election may lose legitimacy, which reduces the
probability of decisiveness (Börgers 532).
Still others focus on the altruistic benefits of voting. This explanation
views voting as expressive in its intent and considers casting a ballot a
consumption activity that offers the benefits of feeling a sense of civic duty
and a patriotic self-image (Jakee and Sun 61). While the benefit of civil duty
(+D in the rational calculus) may factor into some citizens’ rational calculi,
the theory is not falsifiable. Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole’s theory of prosocial behavior recognizes the interaction of altruistic motivations with other
motivations:
To gain a better understanding of pro-social behavior, we sought,
paraphrasing Adam Smith, to “thoroughly enter into all the passions and
motives which influence it.” People’s actions indeed reflect a variable mix of
altruistic motivation, material self-interest, and social or self-image concerns
(1674).
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Rather than disputing the explanation of altruism, which cannot be disproven
for lack of falsifiability, this account of voting accepts it as a potential
explanatory factor. If individuals are genuinely motivated by their own
preference to vote for purposes of a higher ideal—i.e. civic duty, democratic
functioning, or belief in a candidate—then they are making genuine choices.
Not all votes can be rendered a choice, however. Benevolence in
choice is incompatible with social motivations, as previously defined. Thus,
while Bénabou and Tirole claim that there is an interaction between formal
incentives, social norms, and individuals’ altruistic motivations, this account
rejects such an interaction of motivations. If a vote is cast for exogenously
defined preferences, conditioned on normative and empirical expectations,
it is not an active choice, but a behavior conforming to a norm.
A non-choice occurs when people “perform good deeds and refrain
from selfish ones because of social pressure and norms that attach honor
to the former and shame to the latter” (Bénabou and Tirole 1653). While
previous rational choice explanations failed, the voting paradox may be
explained through social norms. Amaro de Matos and Barros subscribe to
this explanation, viewing others’ decisions to vote as creating a cascade of
influence on a citizens’ preference to vote (2004). The preference to vote
is conditional upon the empirical expectations of others voting. Observing
high voting rates in previous elections would produce this empirical
observation, satisfying the first prong of social norms. Observation of voting
behavior may come through word-of-mouth reports, television reports, or
the long lines at a polling booth. While the Australian ballot makes the ballot
unobservable, the act of voting itself has many opportunities for observation.
Voting also fits the criterion of normative expectations. If a norm to
vote exists in a community, then a citizen will believe that she is expected to
vote by her neighbors and friends. This social pressure misdirects the will
from an endogenously defined preference, characterizing the behavior as a
non-choice. If this is the case, the rate of voting should increase when social
pressure increases. Empirical studies prove this to be true. Funk’s research
in Switzerland suggests that social pressure to conform to the norm of voting
is highest in smaller communities. She writes:
The sharpest test for social pressure arises from looking at the effect of postal
voting in different-sized communities. A large number of anthropological
studies have documented that social control is particularly strong in small
and close-knit communities. People know each other and gossip about who
does their civic duty and who does not. Therefore, the relief from social
pressure is supposedly the highest in small communities and ceteris paribus,
also this negative ‘social effect’ on turnout (Funk 1).
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Her empirical evidence of the postal voting system in Switzerland corroborates
this social effect, as voter participation was more negatively affected in
smaller communities (Funk 1). Smaller communities, which had the most
inconvenient and shortest timeframes to vote, had a 50 percent lower increase
in turnout (1.5 percent increase). Funk explains the paradoxical findings of
lowering the costs of voting through social incentives. She says that smaller
group sizes exert more social pressure and that “adding an opportunity that
allows to escape social pressure might reduce pro-social behavior” (Funk 9).
Tadelis corroborates this pressure in his finding that cooperation increases in
a trust game if defection is made public (2007).
Voting can either signal conformity to a norm that “everyone votes”
or a norm that “a good citizen votes.” Funk notes that evidence suggests
that citizens with a strong sense of civic duty are more likely to vote, proving
a social norm exists that a good citizen should vote. Under either norm,
the preference to vote is dependent upon the normative expectations of
conformity, rendering it an exogenously directed behavior. Signaling voting
behavior is critical for expectations, since it makes the action observable.
A citizen can signal ex ante, indicating her intentions to vote, or ex post,
indicating that she did, in fact, vote. Signaling ex post may occur in American
society with the “I voted!” stickers. The simple “I voted!” sticker is a way to
signal a voter’s patriotism and conformity to a social norm.
Compliance to the norm also creates social benefits, transforming
the mixed-motive game into a coordination game, thereby solving the freerider problem. Bénabou and Tirole note that social signaling is present in
pro-social behavior due to the reputational rewards of contributing to the
public good or conforming to the social norm. They write, “Decisions carry
reputational costs and benefits, reflecting the judgments and reactions of
others—family, friends, colleagues, employers. The value of reputation may
be instrumental or purely affective (social esteem or shame as a hedonic
good)” (Bénabou & Tirole 1654). Funk says that the benefits of signaling
include social esteem from showing up at the polling station, the avoidance
of social sanctions, or the benefits of being perceived of as a cooperator in the
community (2). She writes:
Both types [defectors and cooperators] may receive signaling benefits from
showing up at the polls, e.g. through social esteem from people who are
at the polls and from those who learn about the voting act through gossip.
As community size increases, social connectedness decreases and signaling
benefits as well…. If social pressure matters for voting decisions, the
presence of mail-in ballots provides an opportunity to escape. Therefore,
the more social concerns matter for voting decisions, the more distinctive
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the mail ballot system’s trade-off between cost reduction and a reduction in
social incentives (Funk 3).

Bénabou and Tirole point to vote by mail as reducing the signaling effect by
making the act of voting unobservable. This explains the unaffected voting
rate in Switzerland despite reduced costs, since the main social effect in the
mail-voting system was the removal of social pressure. It reduced the costs
at the expense of the social benefits.
Taken together, the empirical and normative expectations render
the decision to vote a conditional preference. The preference for behavior is
dependent upon the interdependencies of decisions. Voting is a non-choice
because it is counter-preferential: individuals appear to calculate the time and
expense of voting as less than the social benefits of conforming. The social
benefits of voting make the act beneficial not for its own sake (i.e. fulfilling a
civic duty), but for the sake of appearance. Thus, the conditional preference
is focused on society’s preferences rather than individual preferences.
Amaro De Matos and Barros write, “the utility of voting or not voting for
an individual depends on the decisions made by the individuals in his/her
given social-relations network” (241). The action is not taken for “altruistic”
preferences, but for the social preference to conform to a norm of voting.
As Mill says, “He who does anything because it is the custom makes no
choice” (Sandel 51). If the norm to vote or the norm that a good citizen votes
exists in a community, then high participation rates are nothing more than
collections of individual non-choices, which just so happen to create positive
social benefits. A high voting rate is banal behavior with good results. Thus,
norms create not only a banality of evil, but also a banality of goodness in
society.
Organ Donation
Default organ donation serves as the example of a pro-social
phenomenon perpetuated by non-thinking non-choice. This example stands
out from the previous examples, since the state, and not society, is the agent
directly influencing the choice. The case study is still relevant because the
state does not mandate donation nor does it impose penalties or rewards
for opting-out of the donation system. The example also has a wealth of
literature surrounding autonomy in relation to choice. Social norms are still
at play in default organ donation systems, as they signal the preferences of
society through the default decision.
Organ donation clearly fits into the “pro-social” category, as more
than 112,000 people are in need of an organ transplant in the United States
at any given moment. The need for donations is urgent, as 6,521 patients
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died while waiting for organ transplants in 2010 alone. Eighteen people
die each day, on average, waiting for an organ donation. Due to this high
need, organ donation presents a social dilemma, since only 14,507 donations
occurred in the United States in 2010 (New York Organ Donor Network).
In addition, there seems to be a contradiction between people’s preferences
and actions. When surveyed, 97% of respondents indicated their support
for transplantation, yet their willingness did not translate into their donation
decisions, as only 43% checked the organ donation box on their driver’s
license. Majorities were also willing to donate while living, but only 64%
of those respondents marked their drivers’ licenses in favor of donating and
only 36% had an organ donor card (Sunstein 178). The mismatch of supply
to demand and stated preference to action has incentivized practitioners to
search for creative ways to increase the supply.
One method practitioners use to induce pro-social behavior is
to reduce the costs. Yet, the costs for living organ donors cannot easily
be circumvented. Donating a liver, for instance, has the high cost of
going through anesthetized surgery, followed by the potential for health
complications. According to a rational choice model, the risks and costs of
donating an organ while living outweigh the benefits. Despite this fact, in
2010, 282 living people donated their livers (out of 6,291 total donations)
and 6,276 donated their kidneys (out of 16,8898 total donations) (New York
Organ Donor Network). These people were likely not acting “irrationally,”
but donating to a family member or friend based on genuine altruistic
motivations, since altruism is possible at an intimate level.
Despite the notable altruistic motivations to donate an organ,
the high costs of donation while living make the rational choice to not to
donate to a stranger, or someone outside an inner-circle of friends and
family. Descriptively speaking, individuals are largely complying with the
canonical model of decision-making according to their rational self-interest.
Their calculations direct their action toward the choice to not donate while
living. What remains to be explained, however, is the low rate of deceased
organ donations. Of the 14,507 organ donors in the United States in 2010,
only 7,943 were deceased donors (New York Organ Donor Network). Of the
360,000 transplants that have occurred since 1998, 80% came from deceased
donors (Sunstein 177). The rate of living to deceased donations is nearly
identical, despite the much lower cost of donation when deceased. Absent
spiritual, religious, or moral concerns, the costs of organ donation when
deceased should be negligible.
One controversial solution to organ donation is a “donorcyle”
mechanism, which points to the effect of increased organ donations (a 10
percent increase) upon repealing motorcycle helmet laws (Dickert-Conlin
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et al. 2009). This intervention, however, produces a beneficial externality
only at the expense of increased fatalities. Moreover, the number of donors
on the deceased donation registry necessarily limits this solution. As such,
solutions must target the underlying motivations for not pre-registering to
donate upon death.
As a result of this tradeoff, some look to targeting choice as the
mechanistic solution. Sunstein notes that the primary obstacle to increasing
donations is the requirement of consent, in which surviving family members
consent once deceased or living individuals give prior consent for donation.
Consent is the ultimate use of rationality and autonomy, in which individuals
choose with intentionality, understanding, and without controlling influences
(Beauchamp and Childress 101). Consent is the center of the organ donation
debate, since individuals must give their express agreement to being a donor
before death or a surrogate must consent after death. Any mechanism that
seeks to increase the number of organ donations, rather than focusing on
the demand side through more effective allocation, necessarily grapples with
the concept of consent. Practitioners are encouraged by studies that cite the
mismatch of preference to donate and actual levels of donation. However,
using these studies as the basis for implementing policies that circumvent
consent is fallacious, since individuals may want to appear willing to donate
when surveyed, but genuinely prefer not to donate in reality. Despite this
fallacious justification, many practitioners think “nudging altruism” through
default consent mechanisms is the best solution.
Presumed consent is one system proposed to fix the supply of
organs. The system would presume consent to donate unless the individual
or the family explicitly opts-out. This system may alleviate the shortage,
to an extent. In a study of Europe, countries that had presumed consent
mechanisms (Belgium and Austria) had much higher levels of organ
donation than countries using an opt-in system (the U.K., Germany, and the
Netherlands) (Davis 1383). In a lab experiment, when individuals had to
opt-out of the system, 82% remained donors, in contrast to only 42% who
agreed to be donors if they had to opt-in (Sunstein 180). Thus, the “nudge”
of setting the default to donation, requiring the individual to actively optout, may work to increase registered donors.
Despite this pro-social benefit, default donation mechanisms are
ethically tenuous. Presumed consent is a non-choice, since it bypasses
the individual thought process and exogenously imposes a decision. By
circumventing an individual’s rationality, the policy encourages making
the decision automated. Any behavior that is automated necessarily lacks
a thoughtful preparation, since general rules of conduct cannot “withstand
the wind of thought” (Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment 176). Thus,
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Davis is wrong in his contention that a default system “promotes individual
autonomy by allowing competent adults to make the donation decision for
themselves, rather than have it made for them by relatives” (Davis 1382).
The default mechanism is classified as a “liberal paternal” policy,
because it allows the individual the liberty to opt-out, while nonetheless
signaling the correct decision. The American Medical Association is critical
of the presumed consent mechanism, saying that it “raises serious ethical
concerns unless effective mechanisms are in place for documenting and
honoring refusals” (Davis 1383). Beauchamp and Childress warn that,
“presuming consent on the basis of a general theory of human goods or of
the rational will is morally perilous.” They also refer to the non-choice of
presuming consent: “Consent should refer to an individual’s actual choices,
not to presumptions about the choices the individual would or should make”
(Beauchamp and Childress 107).
In default donation mechanisms, society accompanies the state as
another limiting agent on a person’s freedom to choose to donate. By setting the
default to donation, an individual infers that there is a rational justification for
this decision—a nudge based on sound judgment. The donation default also
serves as a signal for the individual of society’s preferences. Individuals may
infer society’s preference for donation from the default, creating pluralistic
ignorance based on that inference. Individuals are unaware of other society
members’ genuine preferences for donation, so they use the default setting
for organ donation as a signal to infer society’s preferences. This inference
is not based on individual facts, but on the choice menu itself. In this way,
individuals infer the social norm of donation through a process of pluralistic
ignorance not unlike the case of FGM/C. Thus, society encourages defaulting
to a pro-social norm without any basis in endogenously defined preferences.
Social norms exacerbate the limitations of freedom and rationality imposed
by state default donation policies.
Any state mechanism for default donation presents an ethical
dilemma as to whether to induce pro-social behavior at the expense of
imposing the will of society and the state on an individual’s decision. This
tradeoff between granting the liberty to choose and correcting a suboptimal
societal equilibrium is not unlike the tradeoff between deceased motorcyclists
and increased organ donations. The fear is that just as some states may repeal
motorcycle helmet laws to increase the supply of organs, some may restrict
a person’s liberty to choose, bypassing their rationality, in order to increase
the social good. Johnson and Goldstein note, “Defaults can lead to two
kinds of misclassification: willing donors who are not identified or people
who become donors against their wishes. Balancing these errors with the
good done by the lives saved through organ transplantation leads to delicate
Volume 8 | Spring 2013

109

Banal Behavior
ethical and psychological questions” (1338). Those ethical questions stem
from the different causes of “choosing” the default: one can actively look at
the checked box and consent; one can inadvertently keep the box checked
through lack of attention; or one can keep the box checked because one infers
that to be the best decision, as defined not by themselves, but by the state.
The first default setting is a choice because active thought is given to the
decision; the second default setting is a non-choice characterized by lack of
thought and conscientiousness; and the third default is a non-choice based
on social norm’s misdirection of the will toward the exogenous preference to
conform.
Reciprocity norms are another social norm that has affected the organ
donation process. The National Kidney Registry leverages the reciprocity
norm by matching donors to patients in need through an exchange process. If
Person A is willing to donate a kidney to Person B, but it is not a good antibody
match, then, without the Registry, Person B would remain on a long waiting
list for a donation. However, if a similar antibody mismatch occurs with
Person C willing to donate to Person D, then an “exchange” of recipients can
occur. This matching technique can create long chains of exchanges—some
reaching as many as 60 people long (Sack, “60 Lives”). The New York Times
reports that this domino chain began with “an algorithm and an altruist”
and “its momentum fueled by a mix of selflessness and self-interest among
donors who gave a kidney to a stranger after learning they could not donate
to a loved one because of incompatible blood types of antibodies” (Sack,
“60 Lives”). The initial “altruistic” choice is indisputable, since altruism
is certainly possible among close family and friends. The chain, however,
was perpetuated by the reciprocity norm: a person was willing to give a
kidney if and only if another person was willing. Each person’s expectations
of donation were mutually dependent upon the others’ expectations. The
interdependencies of their decisions created conditional preferences to
donate. Thus, donation was no longer for individual, altruistic preferences,
but for conditional preferences.
Thus, there is a tradeoff between freedom to choose and achieving
the optimal level of a public good. The case of organ donation raises concerns
over the extent of society and the state’s inducement of a pro-social decision.
A high rate of donation is undoubtedly a worthy goal, especially in light of
the long waiting lists for transplant patients. Yet is the social-optimal level
of donations worth expending liberty and rationality? Is it just or desirable
for society and the state to encourage non-choice? More significantly, can
society aptly call those who donate through default—through a non-choice—
altruistic?
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The Consequences of Banal Behavior
The cases of social phenomena with negative externalities—
FGM/C and foot-binding—and the cases of social phenomena with positive
externalities—voting and organ donation—are all cases of banal behavior.
These decisions are behavior rather than action because they are not based
on endogenously defined preferences—the individuals are not agents of
their own self-law. The decisions are banal because they are not grounded
in evil or altruistic motivations. In fact, they are not based on individual
preferences at all, but on social preferences, conditional upon the empirical
and normative expectations of others’ actions. The interdependency of
decisions renders them non-choices. The behavior is banal in the lack of
uniqueness, its absence of individuality, its dearth of natality. Without an
altruistic motive for pro-social behavior, a banality of goodness results.
Without an evil motive for anti-social behavior, a banality of evil results. The
banality is based on a lack of thought, the absence of motivation, and the
misdirection of the will. But what are the consequences of this banality?
First, banal behavior has implications for assigning responsibility.
Choice is inextricably linked to personal responsibility. Eleanor Roosevelt
said, “We shape our lives and we shape ourselves…And the choices we make
are ultimately our own responsibility” (Greenfield 7). The link between
choice and responsibility for the consequences of those decisions is ingrained
in political theory, the legal system, and in advertising (Greenfield 9). It
comes in two flavors, according to Greenfield. On one hand, a choice makes
a person responsible for the consequences of his own actions. The criminal
code, for example, distinguishes between murder and manslaughter based
on the level of intent. When killing is a choice, it warrants more severe
punishment; when killing is not intentional prior to the act, it is afforded
reduced sentencing. On the other hand, a choice is a personal responsibility
in and of itself. The choice to wear a helmet while riding a motorcycle, for
instance, affords the personal responsibility of assuming the risks associated
with that decision. Both choice as responsibility and choice as costs are
leveraged for political gain—either to shift the burden of blame onto the state
or onto the individual.
But if our choices are constrained—by our psychology, the state,
and society—then the link between assigning responsibility to individual
decisions becomes tenuous. Given these constraints, can we appropriately
assign the corresponding costs to an individual’s poor choice? Society
recognizes that when choices are limited, individuals should not bear the
full costs of their actions. Such was the case during Hurricane Katrina, as
only 22% found the individuals living in the devastated neighborhoods
were fully to blame for their situations (Greenfield 16). In this case, citizens
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judged the victims as not fully responsible for their circumstances because
their choices were limited. As such, they diffused the responsibility among
many, including the state and local governments, charitable organizations,
and Nature herself.
The diffusion of responsibility occurs frequently in society:
employers take responsibility for certain risks for their employees; insurance
companies take on the responsibility of the risks of natural disasters; and the
government assumes the responsibility for its citizens’ damage to national
infrastructure. Yet it is a fallacy to point to the last person in the chain of
choices for bearing full responsibility of any action. While Hitler is the person
symbolically blamed for the Holocaust, many others, including bureaucrats
like Eichmann and bystanders in the community share the blame. As
Greenfield notes, “Many events have multiple causes and influences, and
the responsibility for creating them is dispersed. Sometimes responsibility
is shared” (158). However, acknowledging that multiple actors sometimes
share blame, choices can nevertheless only come from individuals. As Arendt
says, “There is no such thing as collective guilt or collective innocence; guilt
and innocence make sense only if applied to individuals” (Responsibility and
Judgment 29). What happens, then, if individuals’ decisions are not choices,
but non-choices dictated by society? If individuals are not choosing their
actions, then they cannot be fully responsible for the consequences. Given the
host of constraints and the inescapable presence of social norms, individuals
may never be fully responsible for their actions. This leads to an irresolvable
dilemma in the theory of banal behavior of assigning responsibility to
non-choices. While not a conclusive answer, I believe the best approach
to resolving this dilemma is to assign responsibility to individuals, while
recognizing where others are to blame, including limiting institutions and
circumstances. If responsibility diffuses to the point that every crime and
every poor decision is attributed to “society,” individuals would lose all
sense of self-worth and anarchy may ensue without the possibility for law
and order. At the core of responsibility, after all, is a respect for oneself.
Blaming society only degrades a human to a laboring, unthinking member
of the herd.
Another result of the theory is the explanatory power of
incomprehensible acts. For Kant, those who are tempted to do wrong by
following their motives are radically evil. Indeed, this theory of choice does
not eliminate the possibility of choices guided by genuine evil or altruism.
On March 11, 2012, U.S. Staff Sgt. Robert Bales allegedly shot and killed
16 civilians in Afghanistan, 9 of whom were children. Theories of why he
would kill abound. Some attributed his actions to a psychological trauma
caused by four tours in Afghanistan (Dao, “At Home”). Others, including
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columnist David Brooks, attributed the massacre to genuinely evil motives:
“even people who contain reservoirs of compassion and neighborliness also
possess a latent potential to commit murder.” Brooks contends that it is
human nature to kill, as “we’re natural-born killers and the real question is
not what makes people kill but what prevents them from doing so” (Brooks,
“When the Good Do Bad”). I am not qualified to determine what motivated
Bales’ rampage; rather, the news commentary serves as evidence that most
want to attribute a radically evil motive or psychological disturbance to
the tragedy. The theory of non-choice offers a third explanation for such
evil consequences. Rather than emotional motives causing evil, a simple
counter-preferential decision or a decision without thought can cause harm.
On a larger scale, these non-choices can become a coercive force on free will,
perpetuating an evil throughout a population.
On the other hand, one surprising consequence of the theory of banal
behavior is that good results can result from non-choices. Just as Eichmann
wasn’t motivated to kill in a Hannibal Lecter sense of evil, individuals need
not be motivated by the goodness of their hearts to promote social welfare.
Lacking altruistic motivations, however, may be disheartening to readers.
Individuals desire to attribute good motives to good actions, since it paints
a rosy picture of humanity. Realizing that an action is undertaken for
ulterior purposes taints the outcome’s goodness. For instance, we discount
a salesperson’s compliment, since we know it may be given disingenuously
to encourage purchases. One could argue that motives should not matter
for good outcomes. Should I care whether a neighbor votes for the “right
reasons” of civic duty or for the sake of appearances? Society benefits by the
action whatever the motivation.
My preference for altruism may be an additional example of a
“nosy preference,” or a preference I fallaciously hold over another person’s
preferences. Nosy preferences undoubtedly lead to inefficient outcomes—
perhaps crowding out potentially beneficial actions through my preference
for an altruistic motivation behind the good effect. One manifestation
of nosy preferences is the disdain of markets for goods that are typically
donated—presumably from altruistic motivations. Alvin Roth finds that
repugnance for certain types of transactions are a constraint on markets.
Alongside other examples like the ban on eating horse meat in California,
Roth says, “The laws against buying or selling kidneys reflect a reasonably
widespread repugnance, and this repugnance may make it difficult for
arguments that focus only on the gains from trade to make headway in
changing these laws” (37). Roth notes that individuals are repulsed over
buying and selling organs, but tolerant of transactions that leverage the norm
of reciprocity, such as kidney exchange programs. I agree that repugnance
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plays a role in limiting markets for scarce goods, but I disagree that it is
the only cause. Rather, the preference for “in-kind” exchanges indicates
a preference for altruism. The banality of goodness complicates the myth
of altruistic donations. Recognizing the limits to altruistic actions, and
the genuine banality in many positive actions, may create an opening for
“repugnant” markets. If individuals find that good motives are not behind
good donations, then perhaps they would not find markets for scarce goods
as distasteful as before.
Opening up the opportunity to monetize goods that were previously
based in altruistic donations has tremendous consequences for choice.
Greenfield notes that Rab Nawas, a farmer in Pakistan, was indebted to
his landlord and had only two valuables: his children and his kidneys.
His decision to sell one of his kidneys—not for altruistic purposes, but for
monetary reasons—undoubtedly helped someone in Europe, Australia, or
the United States who was willing to pay (Greenfield 137). A preference
for altruism would have limited this choice at both ends—limiting Nawas’
decision to sell his organ and limiting the willing patient’s ability to purchase
the organ. The nosy preference for altruism would have left both worse off:
Nawas would have remained impoverished and the patient would have
remained on the long donor list, assuming his survival. Nawas’ choice is not
an isolated example, either, as the World Health Organization estimates that
one fifth of all kidneys transplanted worldwide come from a black market
rather than a charitable donation (Greenfield 137). While Nawas’ decision
was a choice, rather than a banal non-choice, it nonetheless illustrates that
our preference for altruistic choices may be misguided. The banality of
goodness may not be as horrible a consequence after all.
In the same vein of thought, leveraging the banality of goodness to
promote pro-social consequences may be counterproductive. Specifically,
practitioners who attempt to make good actions the default decision—
transforming a choice into a non-choice—may “crowd out” genuinely
altruistic actors or create a backlash. In Brazil, for instance, the switch to
presumed consent from an opt-in method of organ donations led to public
outcry and lower donation rates, forcing the country to switch back to the
non-default option. People didn’t seem to like when they were induced by
the state to act altruistically. On a larger scale, there appears to be a negative
relationship between inducements of deceased donations through state
policies and live donation rates. The following chart illustrates the clear
negative relationship between deceased and live donation rate, indicating
a possible “crowding out” of altruistic, live donors when deceased default
mechanisms are in place. The countries with presumed consent (green) also
display a negative correlation between the two types of donations, suggesting
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that altruistic, live donations decrease as individuals are induced to donate
upon death:
Live and Deceased Kidney Donation Rates

(Tabarrok, “Presumed Consent and Organ Donation”)
This negative relationship between live and deceased donations
may indicate that a “crowding out” of altruism occurs when states attempt
to induce donation through various default mechanisms. Jason Dana
warns against this interpretation, arguing that because the countries with
defaults were getting so few live donors, they were forced to choose a default
mechanism. He goes on to say that, “It could even be that these countries have
less marriage and population growth, and it is mostly family ties that guilt
people into donating one of their kidneys while alive” (Dana, “Presumed
Consent and Organ Donation”). Even if altruism is not crowded out in these
countries, the possibility leads to a worrisome philosophical implication: if
we begin to recognize the banality of goodness and attempt to leverage it for
the “good of society,” are we risking crowding out genuine altruism? Will
society no longer recognize altruism as genuine when it in fact is, allowing
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cynicism to override the possibility of genuine human goodness?
The graph of organ donations points to another implication of banal
behavior and non-choice: the role of culture in limiting and influencing our
decisions. Culture matters for the rates of organ donation, clearly evidenced
by the wide variations of donation rates by country (Dana, “Presumed
Consent and Organ Donation”). Both the classical and behavioral model
focus on the limitations of the state and psychology, neglecting society as
another limiting agent, but culture matters for individual choice. Cultural
influences are hard to recognize, since they pervade all aspects of life, from
gender roles to religious mores (Greenfield 3). Greenfield writes:
If I am correct in arguing that deeply embedded cultural assumptions and
biases influence us in ways we hardly recognize, then we should worry a
great deal if the culture around us bombards us with messages that do not
correspond with what we would believe is we considered things from a
distance. The task for us is to identify the elements of culture that have these
influences (91).

Greenfield notes a host of cultural influences on choice, many of which
link to the aforementioned paradoxical social phenomenon: patriotism and
nationalism partially explains voting norms; religiosity and gender roles
help to explain FGM/C; religiosity and consumerism are at play in organ
donation rates; and sexuality and gender roles help explain foot-binding.
This study enhances the classical and behavioral models by including society
as an additional constraint on free choice.
Most significantly, culture is self-reinforcing, encouraging
conformity to behavioral rules and coercing individuals to make counterpreferential decisions. Alexis de Tocqueville wrote of the “soft despotism”
in democracies and the implications of despotism in Democracy in America:
I see an innumerable multitude of men, alike and equal, who turn about
without repose in order to procure for themselves petty and vulgar pleasures
with which they fill their souls. Each of them, withdrawn apart, is a virtual
stranger, unaware of the fate of the others: his children and his particular
friends form for him the entirety of the human race; as for his fellow citizens,
he is beside them but he sees them not; he touches them and senses them not;
he exists only in himself and for himself alone, and, if he still has a family,
one could say at least that he no longer has a fatherland.
Over these is elevated an immense, tutelary power, which takes sole charge
of assuring their enjoyment and of watching over their fate. It is absolute,
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attentive to detail, regular, provident, and gentle…It works willingly for
their happiness, but it wishes to be the only agent and the sole arbiter of that
happiness. It provides for their security, foresees and supplies their needs,
guides them in the principal affairs, directs their industry, regulates their
testaments, divides their inheritances. Can it not relieve them entirely of the
trouble of thinking and of the effort associated with living? In this fashion,
every day, it renders the employment of free will less useful and more rare;
it confines the action of the will within a smaller space, and bit by bit it
steals from each citizen the use of that which is his own [Emphasis added]
(Tocqueville 187–88).

Tocqueville’s words touch upon the theory of social norms as non-choices.
Individuals in society are strangers to one another—they act only according
to their immediate self-interest. Yet, their actions have tremendous
implications on one another by creating an “immense, tutelary power”
of social norms. These norms subvert individual free will, relieving the
individual of the “trouble of thinking” by directing them to the correct
behavioral rule. Individuals no longer need to think to decide; rather, they
look to society to choose for them. Just as behavioral economics points to
the mental crutches of psychological heuristics, the theory of banal behavior
points to the additional crutch of social norms to guide decisions. The logical
implication of an over-reliance on society to guide behavior, according to
Tocqueville, is that free will fits within a smaller space.
Most importantly, the thing “stolen from each citizen” from an
increasingly constrained free will is the prospect of an individual, unique
choice. If Albert Camus is correct in saying that “life is the sum of all of
your choices,” then free choice is the essence of individuality. As William
Jennings Bryan observed, “destiny is not a matter of chance, it is a matter of
choice” (Greenfield 7). If most of our behavior is dependent upon others’
actions, then can we be distinct individuals in the herd of society? If we
continue to place conforming to society on a higher platform than unique
decisions, then how can our choices reflect who we truly are? Excess banal
behavior, without moments of genuine free choice, may in fact turn society
into an innumerable multitude, alike and equal.
Redeeming Choice
Both the classical and behavioral models fall short of sufficiently
explaining paradoxical social phenomena. The assumption of perfect
rationality in the classical model clashes with the descriptive account of
irrationality in behavioral economics. I reject that individuals must be either
perfect decision-makers or irrational fools. The concept of non-choice offers
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a more satisfying explanation to paradoxical social phenomena. Individuals
are no longer irrational or naïve when they act against their self-interest or
preferences, but following society’s behavioral script for their behavior. The
presence of social norms more adequately describes behavioral paradoxes
such as voting and incomprehensible actions such as FGM/C.
In addition, neither the classical or behavioral theories provide
adequate normative guidance to decision-making. While the behavioral
model certainly expanded upon the classical model by offering a more
accurate account of human decision-making, it did not offer any normative
advice for how all individuals can avoid acting irrationally without elite
education. Moreover, individuals in the behavioral model are entirely
un-free—completely constrained by choice architecture. If freedom is the
centerpiece of democratic functioning, then individuals must be offered
normative guidance for how to realize their capacity for free choice.
In society, Greenfield says, “we’re fish that need to discover the
water. If we do, some of the power that cultural norms have on our decision
making may evaporate” (91). His normative guidance to redeeming choice
is fourfold: a person must recognize the power of the situation, acknowledge
irrationalities, be mindful of habits, and cultivate an awareness of cultural
influence. I believe the underlying mechanism beneath these prescriptions,
and the proper mechanism for “discovering the water,” is courage and
thought.
Counter-preferential non-choices may be the cause of great evil.
Conformity becomes the motivation for action rather than acting according to
a self-determined preference. The most classic excuse for a child disobeying
rules is “but everyone else was doing it!” There is a long historical trend
of linking hypocrisy to morality. Arendt says the Socratic condition under
which we are prevented from doing wrong is “the condition of not being
at odds with ourselves even though this might mean to be at odds with
the whole world” (Responsibility and Judgment 122). Dostoevsky in The
Brothers Karamazov writes that for Dmitri K. to win salvation, he must
never lie to himself. Similarly, for Kant, moral conduct depends upon man
not contradicting himself by making an exception in his own favor. Arendt
writes, “Morally speaking, this should be enough not only to enable him to
tell right from wrong, but also to do right and avoid wrong” (Responsibility
and Judgment 67). Thus, man has a duty to himself before duties to others.
The normative advice to avoid counter-preferential non-choices is simply to
recognize your preferences and act upon them. Do not act for the sake of
others, but for your own sake. This takes courage to act against the fray,
but is necessary to avoid the hypocrisy that is the root of evil consequences
caused by non-choices.
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Non-choices caused by a lack of thought are equally dangerous; if
we are unaware of the consequences of our decisions, then we are unable to
guard against evil acts. As Arendt shows, thinking is no small feat. I want
to highlight what I believe is the most difficult aspect of thought: its solitary
nature. Solitude brings quiet, a condition necessary to escape the noise of
society and to think for oneself. For Aristotle, “The distinction between quiet
and unquiet…. is like the distinction between war and peace: just as war
takes place for the sake of peace, thus every kind of activity, even the process
of mere thought must culminate in the absolute quiet of contemplation”
(Arendt, The Human Condition 15).
Society creates the noise that interrupts the peace required to think.
Never before has this condition been so difficult to obtain. According to
the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ American Time Use Survey (2011), each day
the average American spends 8.2/7.8 hours on work (for women and men,
respectively), 2.6/2.1 hours on household activities (for women and men,
respectively), and 2.7 hours watching TV. Significantly, the time spent on
leisure activities that included computers or video games varied widely by
age: those age 75 and over spent 1.1 hours reading and only 18 minutes on
electronic leisure activities, while individuals ages 15 to 19 read for an average
of 6 minutes and spent 1.1 hours on electronic entertainment (Bureau of Labor
Statistics, “Time Use Survey”). With all of these forms of distraction—work,
household labor, TV, and computers—it is not an unreasonable conclusion
to say that people spend little time simply thinking. In fact, the survey
measured that Americans spend on average .28 hours each weekday and
.34 each weekend thinking/relaxing. This time also varied widely by age,
as those ages 75 and over spent .64 hours each day relaxing/thinking, while
those ages 15 to 19 spent only .11 hours each weekday (Bureau of Labor
Statistics, “Table 11”). The negative relationship between thinking and using
electronics is clear: those older Americans who used fewer electronics had
more time to think, while younger Americans who used more electronics
had less time to think (See Appendix D). If thinking is valuable for proper
decision-making and essential for choice, then Americans who value the
“American Dream,” which is rooted in the principles of free choice, should be
alarmed. The normative solution to redeeming free choice in our democratic
society, founded on the “consent of the governed,” is to spend more time
thinking. The data points to one specific piece of advice toward this end:
put down the iPhone, the iPad, and the iMac. One cannot think with the
noise of social media streaming from multiple sources—it declares war on
the solitude of rationality.
Letting go of electronics, just like thinking itself, feels unnatural
and will take discipline. However, the benefits of taking the time and quiet
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space to think are too numerous to enumerate. Three specific beneficial
consequences of thinking are of note. First, thought prepares the individual
to realize her choice in action. It does so by striking roots in memories,
generating preferences, and discerning the proper method of action.
Without these preparatory features, actions are rendered automated. They
are not human action, but animal behavior. Second, thought conditions
humans against evildoing and predisposes them to altruism by striking
roots in emotions and memories among fellow human beings. Arendt says,
“The very word conscience, at any rate, points in this direction insofar as it
means ‘to know with and by myself,’ a kind of knowledge that is actualized
in every thinking process” (Responsibility and Judgment 160-161). Because
action is always in the presence of others, someone can never transcend
this world of man-made things and other beings when in action. This is a
necessary condition of action, since “things and men form the environment
for each of man’s activities, which would be pointless without such location”
(The Human Condition 22). Thus, connecting through actions is limited
to the people directly affected by the action. Thinking is the only activity
that is capable of transcending the physical world, thereby creating the
possibility of infinite connections to others. Thinking on abstractions and
intangibles creates intellectual connections among people. After all, the love
and sorrow I experience are uniquely my own, but are nonetheless shared
experiences among all humans since the dawn of time. Thinking on these
shared experiences guards against my decision to cause harm to others,
and encourages me to act altruistically through our shared intellectual
connections. While action creates the condition for remembrance, thinking
is the process of remembering, striking roots with our fellow beings (Arendt,
The Human Condition 9).
Finally, while thinking connects, it also distinguishes humans from
one another. Despite the tremendous pressure to conform in society, an
individual always retains the free space of thought. Whatever her outward
actions and statements of beliefs, she is always capable of privately holding
differing principles. This capacity for free thought makes each human unique,
as no thought can be replicated by another. Even if an individual becomes
an automated member of the herd—continually making non-choices and
engaging in banal behavior—she retains her uniqueness of thought. For
these reasons, I agree with Arendt that, the “highest and perhaps purest
activity of which men are capable is the activity of thinking” (The Human
Condition 3). Choice is not choice without thought.
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